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INTRODUCTION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act1 is perhaps the most significant single 
piece of consumer legislation of all time.2 By creating a pair3 of 
simplified regulatory pathways for approval of copied versions4 of 
 
 1.  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. While this Act today is universally 
known and cited as the Hatch-Waxman Act, in earlier years it was more commonly 
known as the Waxman-Hatch Act. See Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer 
Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One 
Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS (ISSUE 2 SUPPLEMENT) 110 (1996). 
 2.  A recent study characterized the consumer benefit from the Act. It 
sought to determine the “total savings that have accrued to the U.S. health care 
system from substituting generic drugs for their brand-name counterparts,” and 
the study concluded “that from 1999 through 2010 doing so saved more than 
$1 trillion.” See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING: 
RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE (2012). 
 3.  These pathways are commonly known as the “paper NDA” and “ANDA,” 
or “abbreviated new drug application,” options that became available through the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and are discussed in detail infra Parts I, III.C. 
 4.  The reference in this article to a “copied version” of a medicine refers to 
a product that was developed by someone other than the originator of the 
medicine. The originator of the medicine refers to the entity that originally 
developed the medicine and secured regulatory approval to market the medicine. 
As will be explained infra Part I, entities that develop copied versions of new 
medicine typically make use of abbreviated regulatory filings—for example, the 
ANDA pathway—to secure marketing approval for their copied versions. 
2
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new drugs,5 the Act provided a legal and economic framework for 
creating an entirely new industry: today’s generic drug industry. As 
a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers 
now supply American consumers with a wide spectrum of high-
quality, low-cost copies of an array of important medicines. The 
economics of this new industry were made possible by dramatically 
abbreviating the otherwise demanding requirements6 imposed on 
the originators of new medicines to secure regulatory approval for 
marketing of their innovations.7 
 
 5.  As used herein, the terms “drug” and “biologic product” have the same 
meanings as in the MODDERN Cures Act of 2013. See H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 4 
(2013) (“The term ‘biological product’ has the meaning given to that term in 
section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262)” and “[t]he term 
‘drug’ has the meaning given to that term in section 201 of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).”). The more generic term “medicines” is 
used herein to reference both drugs and biologic products. 
 6.  Before a new medicine can come to market, three phases of clinical 
trials—that is, trials involving human subjects—must follow the preclinical or 
animal studies required to ethically justify proceeding to test an experimental 
medicine in human beings. The last of the three phases of human trials 
(Phase III) is the point at which substantial evidence of safety and effectiveness 
must be established for a new medicine to be approved for marketing. See Clinical 
Trial Phases, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases 
.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
 7.  The past one hundred years have brought about nothing short of a 
revolution in the regulatory requirements to bring new medicines to market. 
Following enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 
(1906), Congress created the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
oversee the safety of drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
of 1938 (FDC Act), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040. Subsequently, biologic products came 
under federal regulation with the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), ch. 373, 
58 Stat. 682 (1944), but it was not until the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the 
FDC Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), that the current requirements 
for safety and effectiveness for new drugs were put into place as a result of the 
thalidomide tragedy. See Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining 
Regulatory Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 23 
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). Today, a New Drug Application 
(NDA) filed to secure FDA approval must contain “full reports of investigations 
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and 
whether such drug is effective in use” before it can be given regulatory approval 
for marketing. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
   The path a drug travels from a lab to your medicine cabinet is 
usually long, and every drug takes a unique route. . . .  
. . . . 
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Since enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, the 
generic drug industry has come to dominate quantitatively the U.S. 
prescription drug market.8 The unqualified success of the Hatch-
Waxman Act in this respect helped pave the way for, indeed made 
inevitable, the enactment of the Biosimilars Act in 2009.9 This law 
was intended by its proponents to accomplish for copied versions of 
biologic medicines10 what the Hatch-Waxman Act had accom-
plished for drugs.11 
 
   Most drugs that undergo preclinical (animal) testing never even 
make it to human testing and review by the FDA. The drugs that do 
must undergo the agency’s rigorous evaluation process, which 
scrutinizes everything about the drug—from the design of clinical trials 
to the severity of side effects to the conditions under which the drug is 
manufactured. 
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 8.  Approximately eighty-four percent of prescriptions in the United States 
are for generic drugs. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, DECLINING 
MEDICINE USE AND COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 15 (2013) (citing IMS HEALTH, 
NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION AUDIT (2012)). At the turn of the century, these copied 
versions of new medicines had less than fifty percent of the U.S. prescription drug 
market. 
 9.  Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, tit. VII, subtit. A, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010). The Biosimilars Act 
was passed as a separate title of the same act that contained the provisions of law 
often referred to as “Obamacare.” 
 10.  Biologic products include medicines made through modern 
biotechnological processes, rather than largely chemical ones. During the past 
thirty-five years, microbes have been turned into medicine-making machines 
capable of churning out a remarkable spectrum of new-era biologics. Working in 
partnership with Genentech, Eli Lilly and Company launched the era of 
recombinant DNA medicines made from microbes with the 1978 launch of its 
human insulin product, Humulin. See Suzanne White Junod, Celebrating a Milestone: 
FDA’s Approval of First Genetically-Engineered Product, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/SelectionsFrom
FDLIUpdateSeriesonFDAHistory/ucm081964.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2009). 
 11.  “Drugs” are medicines that are mostly the product of chemical synthesis. 
These chemically-based medicines today are used in the treatment of a wide 
spectrum of diseases. Nothing demonstrates the revolution in treatment made 
possible through “new drugs” more than the emerging treatments for HIV/AIDS. 
Stribild, Atripla, and Complera are one-pill-a-day oral medicines for the treatment 
of HIV/AIDS. See ARTIPLA, http://www.atripla.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2014); 
COMPLERA, http://www.complera.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2014); STRIBILD, 
http://www.stribild.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).  
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While the Biosimilars Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act 
addressed fundamentally the same challenge (i.e., how to best craft 
the regulatory/intellectual property (IP) interface12 under which 
copied versions of new medicines might come to market through 
abbreviated regulatory approval processes), the Biosimilars Act was 
no clone of the Hatch-Waxman Act. As will be detailed later in this 
article, key aspects of the regulatory/IP interface contained in the 
Biosimilars Act differ in highly significant ways from the analogous 
provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act. In a nutshell, while the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is highly patent-centric and effectively provides 
that generic drug entry is determined by the expiration of the 
innovator’s relevant patents, the Biosimilars Act is nearly patent-
agnostic and permits biosimilar products to be approved for 
marketing only after an extended IP protection period that 
Congress justified based on the heft of the required data package 
containing the reports of the preclinical and clinical studies 
needed for the original version of a new medicine to be approved 
for marketing. 
In making these two laws materially different, Congress was no 
doubt signaling that, were it inclined to rewrite the Hatch-Waxman 
Act from scratch today, it might well ground a twenty-first century 
incarnation of the Hatch-Waxman law on concepts for a 
regulatory/IP interface found in the Biosimilars Act. Given the 
contemporary economics for bringing innovative new medicines to 
market, the Biosimilars Act’s provisions were apparently regarded 
by Congress as better reflecting the modern economic reality for 
the originators of new medicines. 
The brutality of biopharmaceutical innovators’ economics is 
something that Congress could hardly ignore. Some current 
 
 12.  As noted above, copied versions of new medicines gain access to the 
market under abbreviated regulatory approval pathways specifically designed for 
reviewing and approving such versions. However, there are limitations on the 
availability of marketing approvals under these abbreviated regulatory pathways. 
Approval to begin marketing under an abbreviated approval pathway is typically 
based upon a set of intellectual property rules designed to protect the investment 
of the originator of the new medicine. The limitations can include both access 
limitations, e.g., moratorium provisions that prevent filing for regulatory approval 
under the abbreviated pathway, and direct approval limitations (i.e., provisions 
that define that date upon which a regulatory approval can become effective so 
that the marketing of the copied version can commence). As will be discussed in 
detail infra Part III.D., the limitation on the ability to approve a copied version of a 
new medicine represents what is commonly called “data package protection.”  
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estimates suggest that a $4–5 billion research and development 
(R&D) investment13—and decades of concerted effort14—is now 
required to bring a single new medicine to market. While much of 
the biopharmaceutical industry R&D spending relates to 
experimental medicines that fail to produce a commercial 
product,15 among the R&D projects that do reach the market, only 
about one out of every five to six new medicines ever earns back the 
investment needed to create it.16 Additionally, many of the new 
 
 13.  While the R&D investment needed to bring a single new medicine to 
market varies depending upon the method used to make the calculation, the 
industry R&D investment per new medicine coming to market is roughly $4 billion 
simply using the ratio between $135 billion in annual R&D investment, see infra 
note 21, and actual number of new medicines being approved from marketing 
lying somewhere in the mid-30s. Both lower and higher figures can be found. Dr. 
Francis Collins recently opined, “Developing a drug takes time and money: on the 
average, around 14 years and $2 billion or more. More than 95 percent of the 
drugs fail during development.” Francis Collins, Crowdsourcing Therapeutic Molecules 
for Drug Discovery, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (June 18, 2013), http://directorsblog 
.nih.gov/2013/06/18/crowdsourcing-therapeutic-molecules-for-drug-discovery 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014). Other estimates place the figure on the order of 
$5 billion in R&D costs for every new medicine that comes to market, a figure 
largely based on taking full account of the failed efforts noted by Dr. Collins.  
A company hoping to get a single drug to market can expect to have 
spent $350 million before the medicine is available for sale. In part 
because so many drugs fail, large pharmaceutical companies that are 
working on dozens of drug projects at once spend $5 billion per new 
medicine. 
Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big 
Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is 
-shaping-the-future-of-medicine. Whether the best representation of the magni-
tude of the R&D investment required to bring a new medicine to market is 
$2 billion or $5 billion, or somewhere in between, the implications for the IP 
protection that is necessary to make the investment a viable one are substantially 
unchanged. 
 14.  The time from the initiation of a research program to getting a new 
medicine to a patient is measured not in days or months or years, but decades. 
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2013 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY 
PROFILE 32 (2013) (citing Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the 
Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG 
DISCOVERY 417, 417–29 (2004)). 
 15.  Failed efforts directed to the creation of new medicines may now 
consume at least ninety percent of a biopharmaceutical company’s R&D 
expenditures. See Herper, supra note 13. 
 16.  PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 14 (citing John A. Vernon 
et al., Drug Development Costs When Financial Risk Is Measured Using the Fama-French 
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medicines reaching the market today find themselves competing 
with copied versions of earlier-generation medicines that are sold 
by generic manufacturers—and available to patients—at nominal 
prices.17 
It seems doubtful that the ying of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
regime and the yang of the Biosimilars Act provisions will forever 
coexist with one another. It cannot be good policy that copying 
drugs is to be subject to one set of IP rules and copying biologic 
products is to be governed by a materially different set of IP 
provisions. 
What may be the best next-generation thinking on defining a 
common regime for copied versions of all new medicines to be able 
to come to market can be found in a bill that is now pending 
before Congress. This latest congressional effort is the MODDERN 
Cures Act.18 The MODDERN Cures Act, according to its 
proponents, has the potential to be a quantum improvement over 
both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act in terms of 
meeting the needs and expectations of patients for access to low-
cost, high quality medicines—while spurring greater industry focus 
on the development of new medicines of the greatest potential 
 
Three-Factor Model, 19 HEALTH ECON. 1002, 1002–05 (2009)) (“Only 2 of 10 
marketed drugs return revenues that match or exceed R&D costs.”); see also JIM 
GILBERT ET AL., REBUILDING BIG PHARMA’S BUSINESS MODEL 1–2 (2003), available at 
http://www.fredreichheld.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Public/rebuilding_big 
_pharma.pdf (“Declining R&D productivity, rising costs of commercialization, 
increasing payor influence and shorter exclusivity periods have driven up the 
average cost per successful launch to $1.7 billion and reduced average expected 
returns on new investment to the unsustainable level of 5%. . . . [This is] 
significantly lower than the industry’s risk-adjusted cost of capital. Only one out of 
six new drug prospects will likely deliver returns above their cost of capital, an 
unattractive prospect for investors.”).  
 17.  The nominal cost from many generic drug prescriptions is reflected in a 
CVS Pharmacy promotion, which allows consumers to enroll in its Health Savings 
Pass program that advertises “$1l.99 for 90 days—hundreds of generic 
medications.” See CVS Pharmacy Health Savings Pass, CVS PHARMACY, http://www.cvs 
.com/promo/promoLandingTemplate.jsp?promoLandingId=healthsavingspass 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). In addition, the retail giant Walmart advertises 
“$4 Prescriptions—Choose from hundreds of generic drugs.” See $4 Prescription 
Program, WALMART, http://www.walmart.com/cp/1078664?povid=cat5431-env 
198764-moduleB120712-lLinkFC44DollarPrescriptions (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
 18.  Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory 
Network Cures Act of 2013 (“MODDERN Cures Act of 2013”), H.R. 3116, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
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benefits for patients (i.e., those addressing unmet medical needs). 
Compared to the IP interface provisions of either the Hatch-
Waxman Act or the Biosimilars Act, the MODDERN Cures Act is a 
virtual paragon of simplicity and directness. 
This article offers some commentary on the economic and 
regulatory environment that led to the development of the 
MODDERN Cures Act. It reviews the key provisions of the Act. It 
then lays out the rationale that proponents of the legislation have 
offered for its enactment into law. 
I. THE REGULATORY JOURNEY FROM HATCH-WAXMAN TO THE 
BIOSIMILARS ACT TO THE MODDERN CURES ACT 
No one questions that the medicines that have come to market 
since the end of World War II have been revolutionary in what they 
have contributed to human health. These modern medicines, 
including the approximately three-dozen new such medicines 
being approved each year, stand wholly without precedent 
throughout all of human history.19 The benefits to human health, 
longevity, and productivity due to access to modern medicines, 
were those benefits to be quantified in purely economic terms, 
would certainly be in the trillions of dollars. Many more such 
medicines may be on their way to market,20 driven by the massive, 
 
 19.  The difference an innovative medicine can make can be seen in the fate 
of Arthur Ashe, who was infected with the HIV/AIDS virus in June 1983, 
diagnosed with HIV/AIDS in 1988, and died from complications of the disease in 
February 1993, as contrasted with Earvin (“Magic”) Johnson who was diagnosed 
with HIV/AIDS in 1991 and, more than 20 years later, continues to lead a full and 
active life. Robin Finn, Arthur Ashe, Tennis Champion, Dies of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 1993, at 11, available at 1993 WLNR 3412281; Allison Samuels, 
Magic Johnson: I Survived, DAILY BEAST (May 15, 2011), http://www.thedaily 
beast.com/articles/2011/05/16/magic-johnson-20-years-of-living-with-hiv.html. 
The difference in prognosis as between the two men was defined by an 
experimental combination of new antiretroviral drugs that Mr. Johnson was 
prescribed in 1994. Samuels, supra. Within two years, these experimental 
medicines would be approved by the FDA and become the benchmark for 
HIV/AIDS therapies. 
 20.  The number of new biologic medicines alone under development by 
biopharmaceutical companies exceeds 900. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 
supra note 14, at 44.  
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continuing R&D investments (currently $135 billion annually21), 
being made by the biopharmaceutical industry. 
Most of the medicines being prescribed to U.S. consumers 
today are, however, not sold by the companies that originally 
created them. Rather, the vast majority are supplied by generic 
drug manufacturers. Today, copying of new medicines is 
accomplished within a relatively few years from the time a new 
medicine first reaches the market. The protection period for new 
medicines is short enough to assure that the overwhelming majority 
of all of the innovative drugs that reached the market before the 
end of the twentieth century are, today, sold by copiers—not the 
originators of those medicines. As noted earlier, copying new 
medicines in this manner has been made possible because of new 
regulatory approval pathways that have been put in place under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act. Copied versions of new 
medicines can be developed and regulatory approval sought under 
the abbreviated approval pathways based upon a truncated set of 
filing requirements that relate to the otherwise required testing of 
new medicines for safety and effectiveness. 
The abbreviated regulatory filing requirements are comple-
mented with a companion set of IP rules that are unique to each of 
the two laws. The IP-related provisions, among other aspects, 
define the point in time at which regulatory approval can be 
granted to the copied versions of a medicine under an abbreviated 
regulatory approval pathway. The Hatch-Waxman Act, as noted 
briefly above, established two separate abbreviated regulatory 
approval pathways for copied versions of new drugs to come to 
market. By far, the more important of the two pathways is the 
“abbreviated new drug application” (ANDA) pathway.22 Under the 
 
 21.  Over the past six years, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
of America (branded as “PhRMA”) reports that its members’ expenditures on 
R&D into new medicines have run between $46.4 billion and $50.7 billion. PHARM. 
RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 14, at 2. The International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) puts the global 
pharmaceutical R&D number at $135 billion. INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & 
ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND GLOBAL HEALTH: FACTS AND 
FIGURES 2012, at 5 (2012), available at http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content 
/Publication/2013/IFPMA_-_Facts_And_Figures_2012_LowResSinglePage.pdf. 
 22.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) affords copiers the right to file “abbreviated 
new drug applications” that effectively treat the abbreviated application as though 
it contained all the reports of investigations that were required to secure approval 
9
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ANDA pathway, a generic drug can be approved without repeating 
any of the testing for safety and effectiveness that was required in 
order for the original version of the new medicine to be 
approved.23 
The IP-related provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act tightly 
intertwine regulatory approval of copied medicines with the patent 
rights of the originator. The Act dictates detailed procedures for 
both the originator and the copier to follow in order to precisely 
establish when a generic version of a new medicine might be 
approved under one of the regulatory pathways for copied versions 
of new medicines. These procedures are, under any measure, as 
complex as they are prodigious.24 The Hatch-Waxman Act dictates 
that the originator of a new drug cannot seek regulatory approval 
for a new medicine without providing in its new drug application25 
(NDA) a listing of its relevant patents and their respective 
expiration dates.26 Anyone seeking to copy a medicine using one of 
the abbreviated regulatory pathways is required to make a 
certification with respect to each of the relevant patents listed in 
the originator’s NDA.27 Thereafter, regulatory approval of the 
copier’s generic drug is tied to the expiration of the originator’s 
patents, at least for those not successfully challenged under the 
patent-challenge provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.28 For a 
 
of the original version of the new medicine, even if those investigations were 
maintained as trade secrets. 
 23.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (setting out all the requirements for a complete 
nontesting of a generic drug for safety and effectiveness and bars any additional 
requirements from being imposed on the copier). No requirements for either 
safety or effectiveness testing are imposed on an ANDA applicant. 
 24.  See DONALD O. BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: 
A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS ch. 4 (8th ed. 2013). 
 25.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
 26.  The term “relevant patents” is used in this article to reference the patents 
that are described in 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (“[A]ny patent which claims the drug 
for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of 
using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could 
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”). 
 27.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(vii). 
 28.  When patents are challenged, the regulatory approval of the copied 
version can take place immediately unless the sponsor brings a patent 
infringement action within forty-five days from receipt of the challenge notice, or 
another generic drug manufacturer has an unexpired, nonforfeited generic drug 
marketing monopoly period. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), (iv). 
10
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patent challenge to arise, the copier’s patent certification needs to 
state that the patent in question is not valid or otherwise will not be 
enforceable against the copier’s product. If the originator then 
undertakes to enforce the challenged patent—within a required 
time period set by the Hatch-Waxman Act—the copied version of 
the medicine in most situations cannot be approved unless the 
patent expires or the challenge to the patent succeeds.29 As for the 
originator’s patents, a single patent of the originator is entitled to 
an extension of its term under the “patent term restoration” 
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.30 The patent term restoration 
provisions allow the selected patent to be extended to expire up to 
fourteen years from the original approval date of the new 
medicine.31 
As outlined earlier, the Biosimilars Act took a different 
approach from the Hatch-Waxman Act’s patent-centric IP inter-
face. The Biosimilars Act does require a “patent dialogue”32 of sorts 
 
 29.  The full complexity of these provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act are set 
out in 21 U.S.C. § 355. 
 30.  35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). 
 31.  Id. § 156(c)(3). 
 32.  The “patent dialogue” provisions appear at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2006). 
Among the applicable provisions, within twenty days of seeking regulatory 
approval for the copied version of a biologic product, the copier must provide the 
originator “a copy of the [biosimilar] application . . . and such other information 
that describes the process or processes used to manufacture the biological product 
that is the subject of such application.” Id. § 262(l)(2)(A). The provision of this 
information by the copier then triggers a sixty-day period during which the 
originator must provide “a list of patents for which the reference product sponsor 
believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” and “an 
identification of the patents on such list that the reference product sponsor would 
be prepared to license” to the copier. Id. § 262(l)(3)(A). The patent listing then 
triggers another sixty-day period in which the copier may elect to supply to the 
originator a listing of the patent for which the copier “believes a claim of patent 
infringement could reasonably be asserted” against the copied product, but in any 
event must provide, with respect to each patent identified by the originator, a 
representation that the copier “does not intend to begin commercial marketing of 
the [copied] biological product before the date that such patent expires” or “a 
detailed statement that describes, on a claim by claim basis, the factual and legal 
basis of the opinion of the [copier] that such patent is invalid, unenforceable, or 
will not be infringed by the commercial marketing of the [copied] biological 
product.” Id. § 262(l)(3)(B). A third sixty-day period then commences during 
which the originator must provide, for each patent asserted to be invalid, 
unenforceable or not infringed, “on a claim by claim basis, the factual and legal 
basis . . . that such patent will be infringed . . . and a response to the statement 
11
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to take place between the originator and a would-be copier of a 
new biologic medicine. That dialogue, however, is mostly a 
sideshow. Approval of the copier’s abbreviated regulatory filing is 
made independently from any patent considerations. The patent 
dialogue’s only effects are in the context of subsequent patent 
litigation, should that litigation materialize.33 Instead of tying the 
approval of biosimilars to patent rights, the Biosimilars Act bases 
approval of these copied versions on the originator’s right to 
protect its data package of preclinical and clinical investigations 
that formed the basis for concluding that the original version of the 
biologic product could be approved for marketing.34 Since the 
existence and sufficiency of such data would be critical to any 
conclusion that the copied version of the new biologic medicine 
merits approval under the abbreviated approval pathway, the 
Biosimilars Act protects the originator’s rights to the exclusive 
regulatory benefit of its data package for a period of twelve to 
twelve-and-a-half years from the original approval of the biologic 
product.35 
 
concerning validity and enforceability.” Id. § 262(l)(3)(C). This set of exchanges 
then sets the stage for a fifteen-day period of “good faith” negotiations over which 
of the originator’s patents should be the subject of a patent infringement action. 
Id. § 262(l)(4)(A). If there is agreement with the fifteen-day period, then the 
originator has a thirty-day period in which to bring a patent infringement action 
on each of the agreed patents. Id. § 262(l)(6)(A). If there is no such agreement 
within the fifteen-day period, then the copier must provide to the originator 
the number of patents the copier believes to be in dispute and for which a 
patent infringement action would be appropriate to resolve the dispute. 
Id. § 262(l)(5)(A). Thereafter, a period of up to five days ensues when the copier 
and the originator must exchange lists of patents that each believes would be 
appropriate for patent infringement litigation. Id. § 262(l)(5)(B)(i). The 
originator is entitled to list at least one patent but cannot list more patents than 
the number provided initially by the copier. Id. § 262(l)(5)(B)(ii). Within thirty 
days from the exchange, the originator is obliged to bring a patent infringement 
action on each patent that has been listed. Id. § 262(l)(6)(B). 
 33.  See generally id. § 262(l). 
 34.  See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6), (7). While the regulatory approval of a copied 
version of a new biologic product under the Biosimilars Act is not linked to the 
patents that might exist on the new medicine, the ability to market the copied 
version, once approved, is subject to patents that might be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the copied version. If such a patent is successfully 
enforced, the marketing of the infringing copy may be enjoined until the patent 
has expired. 
 35.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A), (m)(2)(A). 
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The MODDERN Cures Act, at least in one sense, picks up 
where the Biosimilars Act left off. It clearly does so in terms of the 
policy for crafting a regulatory/IP interface. Like the Biosimilars 
Act, the MODDERN Cures Act disconnects regulatory approval for 
copied versions of new medicines from patents and provides 
marketing approval for copied versions of new medicines entirely 
based upon a data package protection period.36 
For the MODDERN Cures Act, the data package protection 
period is fifteen years.37 This period was intentionally made longer 
than both the fourteen-year patent term restoration period under 
the Hatch-Waxman Act and the twelve- to twelve-and-a-half-year 
data package protection period under the Biosimilars Act.38 
 
 36.  House Bill 3116, unlike its predecessor House Bill 3497 from the 112th 
Congress, contains a so-called “registration exclusivity” provision that operates 
independently from either data package protection or the protection accorded 
under any relevant patents. The registration exclusivity provision prohibits the 
approval of a second original version of an approved medicine unless the clinical 
testing for the other original version of the new medicine commenced before the 
approval of the medicine accorded protection under the MODDERN Cures Act. 
An exception to such regulatory exclusivity is made for a second original version of 
a new medicine that exhibits greater effectiveness on a clinically meaningful 
endpoint, greater safety in a substantial portion of the target populations, or 
otherwise makes a major contribution to patient care. H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. 
§ 201(e)(1)(C)(ii) (2013). The registration exclusivity provision does not appear 
to play any significant role in the MODDERN Cures legislation, because it is 
difficult to posit a scenario under which the registration exclusivity provisions 
would be of any relevance. While there have been historical examples of two 
originators seeking to develop the same medicine, each utilizing a nonabbreviated 
approval process, there are no such examples that have arisen where one of the 
originators commences its clinical studies after the other originator has already 
secured regulatory approval to market. Were a second originator to do so, its 
independent work would almost certainly be grounded on the exception—the 
prospect of a significant clinical benefit for patients. 
 37.  H.R. 3116 § 201(i)(4)(B). 
 38.  The longer IP protection period in the MODDERN Cures Act, at least 
compared to either the fourteen-year Hatch-Waxman Act patent term restoration 
period or the Biosimilars Act’s twelve to twelve-and-a-half-year data package 
protection period, is driven by the proponents’ desire to make the provision a 
viable option for the originator of a new medicine. The actual protection period 
for new medicines under the Hatch-Waxman Act or the Biosimilars Act can be 
highly variable, as discussed infra Part III. The actual period of protection from 
copied versions coming to market can exceed the fourteen-year patent term 
restoration period, or fall short of the fourteen-year mark. The Biosimilars Act’s 
twelve- to twelve-and-a-half-year protection period offers only a floor on protection 
from copying a new biologic product. The biologic’s available patent life renders 
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A second (and in some respects a much more profound) 
feature of the MODDERN Cures Act is that, when its provisions 
apply to a new medicine, they supersede all the patent term 
restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.39 In their place, 
the MODDERN Cures Act resets the term of each of the relevant 
patents of the originator of the new medicine to the same fifteen-
year period that applies to data package protection.40 The 
MODDERN Cures Act does so by extending the term of any patents 
that would expire earlier and, if required, mandating a waiver41 of 
protection under other patents that would otherwise expire later. 
Thus, there is perfect alignment under the MODDERN Cures 
Act between the data package protection period and the patent 
protection period.42 This revolutionary feature of the MODDERN 
Cures Act was specifically designed to eliminate the possibility for 
patent litigation as an adjunct to market entry of copied versions of 
the new medicine. In these key respects, therefore, the MODDERN 
Cures Act would turn the litigation-laden Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
regulatory/IP interface on its head. It would likewise moot the 
 
the actual protection period variable; periods of protection from copied versions 
of new medicines coming to market in excess of the fourteen-year patent term 
restoration period remain possible. In contrast, the fifteen-year IP protection 
period under the MODDERN Cures Act operates not just as a floor, but also as a 
ceiling. Were this ceiling on protection to be materially lowered, this IP-based 
incentive to direct new R&D investments into unmet medical needs would quickly 
vanish. Thus, an IP protection period of fourteen years or less could render the 
MODDERN Cures Act a far less effective incentive. All in all, the fifteen-year 
period was crafted to represent the minimum period for effectiveness. As will be 
discussed infra Part V, a lesser ceiling on protection would be difficult to justify—
on the basis of policy or economic considerations. 
 39.  See H.R. 3116 § 201(e)(2). 
 40.  Id. § 201(e)(2)(C). 
 41.  The “patent waiver” provisions of House Bill 3116 are contained in 
section 201(c). They provide that the originator of the new medicine must provide 
“a waiver of the right to enforce or otherwise assert any [relevant] patent . . . which 
may expire after the end of the [fifteen-year IP] protection period . . . against any 
applicable product.” Id. § 201(c)(1)(A). The “applicable products” are any copied 
versions of new medicines seeking approval under abbreviated approval pathways 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act or the Biosimilars Act. The patents to which the waiver 
provisions apply otherwise remain in full force and effect. 
 42.  House Bill 3116, section 201(i)(4)(B) sets the protection period at 
fifteen years from the date of the initial approval for marketing of a new medicine, 
which applies to both approval for marketing of copied versions of new medicines 
under section 201(e)(1) and patent term extensions under section 201(e)(2). 
14
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need for the elaborate “patent dialogue” interface provisions of the 
Biosimilars Act. 
Finally, the MODDERN Cures Act seeks neither to amend nor 
otherwise modify the Hatch-Waxman Act or the Biosimilars Act. 
The provisions of the bill were crafted so as to sit atop these laws, 
but not change either of them.43 It is an Act that can only be 
applied to some, but not all, new medicines—its applicability is 
limited to medicines being investigated to address unmet medical 
needs.44 It is an Act that does not automatically apply to all new 
medicines addressing unmet medical needs—the originator of the 
medicine must request that the new medicine be subject to the 
provisions of the MODDERN Cures Act,45 and the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) must then approve that request by 
determining that the “unmet medical need” test has been met by 
the studies for the experimental medicine on which the request was 
based.46 This unique approach to a regulatory/IP interface comes 
from a surprising source. It is not the product of a trade group or 
industry initiative. It is the product of direct patient advocacy for 
regulatory/IP policies that will result in creating better medicines. 
 
 43.  H.R. 3116 § 201(e)(1) (superseding the timing provisions on approvals 
under Hatch-Waxman Act and Biosimilars Act with respect to access to 
abbreviated approval pathways); id. § 201(e)(2) (superseding the patent 
restoration provisions for new medicines under the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 44.  House Bill 3116, section 201(i)(1) defines when a new medicine 
addresses “unmet medical needs.” 
 45.  House Bill 3116, section 201(a)(1) requires the developer of a new 
medicine (the “sponsor”) to submit a request for designation of the new medicine 
as a “dormant therapy.” The requirements for the request are set out in 
section 201(b) and include a listing of the relevant patents and the provision of an 
appropriate patent waiver of enforceability beyond the fifteen-year “protection 
period.” Id. § 201(b). The developer needs to submit a clinical plan for the 
development of the new medicine, and the request must be filed before seeing 
regulatory approval for the new medicine. Id. § 201(b), (d)(1). 
 46.  Id. § 201(a)(1). The requester of a designation may withdraw the request 
up to the time the new medicine is approved for marketing. Id. § 201(d)(1). 
Under this same provision, the FDA can revoke a designation if the developer fails 
to provide periodic certification that the development of the new medicine for an 
unmet medical need is continuing or if the developer fails to provide a sufficient 
waiver of the right to enforce each relevant patent after the end of the fifteen-year 
protection period. 
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II. THE MODDERN CURES ACT: A PATIENT-LED REGULATORY 
REFORM INITIATIVE 
A. The Congressional Origins of the Bill; Who Is Not Among Its 
Proponents? 
The MODDERN Cures Act, House Bill 3116, was introduced 
by Representative Leonard Lance on September 17, 2013.47 The bill 
superseded a bill with the same title, House Bill 3497, that 
Representative Lance introduced in 2011.48 Like many bills 
introduced in recent years, its title is acronymic. The “MODDERN” 
in “MODDERN Cures” asserts that it is about “Modernizing Our 
Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory Network.”49 Its 
provisions are more ambitious than the acronym would suggest. As 
noted above, the legislation’s target is not limited to just the 
traditional drugs, but its provision would affect the approval of 
both drugs and biological products.50 
In the 112th Congress, the original Lance bill garnered no less 
than four dozen congressional sponsors, nearly equally divided as 
between Democrats and Republicans.51 This bipartisan support 
represented an auspicious start for this effort. Thus far at least, the 
 
 47. Press Release, Representative Leonard Lance, Lance Legislation Designed 
to Help Patients with Chronic Diseases and Disabilities (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://lance.house.gov/press-releases/lance-legislation-designed-to-help-patients 
-with-chronic-diseases-and-disabilities. 
The bipartisan ‘Modernizing Our Drug and Diagnostics Evaluation and 
Regulatory Network (MODDERN) Cures Act’ would update the 
Nation’s drug evaluation process to encourage the discovery and 
development of new treatments for chronic and rare diseases. The 
measure would provide a pathway to bring promising new compounds 
to market and establish a predictable timeline for the introduction of 
generic equivalents. In addition, it will advance creative solutions for 
developing companion diagnostic tests and create a system that 
rewards efficiency and effectiveness to the benefit of all people with 
chronic diseases. 
Id. 
 48.  H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 49.  H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013). 
 50.  See id. § 4. 
 51.  See H.R. 3497 Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011–2012), LIBR. 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:H.R.3497: (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014) (noting that there were forty-eight cosponsors for the original bill). 
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bill has all the hallmarks of becoming a serious legislative 
enterprise. 
Unlike most bills that focus on medicines and their regulation 
by the FDA, the usual trade association suspects—GPhA,52 PhRMA,53 
and BIO54—are not to be found among its early proponents. 
Notwithstanding that lack of visible biopharmaceutical industry 
backing for the bill, an impressive listing of nongovernmental 
entities endorsed the bill in the last Congress.55 According to the 
bill’s proponents, its focus lies in enhancing patient access to 
medicines and diagnostic tools that can address serious diseases. 
Title I of the bill (not addressed in this article) deals with 
diagnostic products, and Title II of the bill, “Capturing Lost 
Opportunities for Patients,” provides the changes that would 
impact the regulatory/IP interface for medicines.56 
 
 52.  Generic Pharmaceutical Association, or “GPhA” as it is now known, is the 
trade association for the generic drug manufacturers. Its website indicates that it is 
“the nation’s leading trade association for manufacturers and distributors of 
generic prescription drugs, manufacturers of bulk active pharmaceutical 
chemicals, and suppliers of other goods and services to the generic industry.” The 
Association, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N, http://www.gphaonline.org/about 
/the-gpha-association (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). It is an amalgamation of the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association, the National Association of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, and the National Pharmaceutical Alliance. Id.  
 53.  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, or “PhRMA” as 
it is typically branded, is the leading trade association for the biopharmaceutical 
industry, headquartered in Washington, D.C. Its website describes its mission as 
“to conduct effective advocacy for public policies that encourage discovery of 
important new medicines for patients by pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
research companies.” About PhRMA, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/about (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 54.  Biotechnology Industry Organization, or “BIO” as it is universally known, 
describes its mission as providing advocacy, business development, and 
communications services for more than 1100 members worldwide. “It is our 
mission to be the champion of biotechnology and the advocate for our member 
organizations—both large and small.” About BIO, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORG., 
http://www.bio.org/articles/about-bio (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).  
 55.  The organizations sponsoring the bill were among the best-known 
patient groups in the United States. For the listing of organizations that agreed to 
be listed as sponsoring organizations, see Letter from Acad. of Physicians in 
Clinical Research et al. to Representatives Leonard Lance and Jay Inslee, 
U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 14, 2012), available at http:// 
www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/NHC_Files/Pdf_Files/MODDERNCuresSign-on 
SupportLetter.pdf.  
 56.  While Title I of House Bill 3116, “Advancing Diagnostics for Patients,” 
contains provisions that would provide enhanced incentives for work on important 
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B. The “Grass Roots” Origin of the Bill; What Is the National Health 
Council? 
Both House Bill 3497 and House Bill 3116 represent initiatives 
developed and advanced by the National Health Council (NHC).57 
The NHC’s mission is to be an advocate for the work of so-called 
“patient advocacy” organizations.58 Once the bills were introduced 
in Congress, the NHC became the bills’ chief proponent.59 
The NHC statement on the introduction of House Bill 3116 
was succinct in summarizing its views on the great promise for the 
bill. It implicitly noted the role of the bill in providing a novel 
interface between the intellectual property protection accorded to 
a new medicine and the entry of copied versions into the 
marketplace when that IP protection gives way, calling its novel 
provisions “game changing legislation.”60 While the NHC call to 
 
new diagnostic tests and capabilities, it contains only a single section—
section 103—that would provide enhanced incentives to promote the 
development of new diagnostic products and techniques. These incentives would, 
unlike the Title II provision, enhance—rather than replace—the protection 
periods for new medicines currently available under law. H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. 
tit. I–II (2013). 
 57.  See generally NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, http://www.nationalhealthcouncil 
.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
 58.  See About the National Health Council, NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, http:// 
www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/pages/page-content.php?pageid=53 (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014) 
   Founded in 1920, the National Health Council is the only 
organization of its kind that brings together all segments of the health 
community to provide a united voice for the more than 133 million 
people with chronic diseases and disabilities and their family 
caregivers. Made up of more than 100 national health-related 
organizations and businesses, the NHC’s core membership includes 
the nation’s leading patient advocacy organizations, which control its 
governance. 
Id. 
 59.  Exemplary of the NHC’s work is the Capitol Hill briefing for House Bill 
3497 on February 28, 2012, providing a link to its Twitter conversation: #moddern. 
Nat’l Health Council, Briefing on the MODDERN Cures Act (Feb. 28, 2012), 
available at http://www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/NHC_Files/Pdf_Files/NHC 
MODDERNCuresActBriefing.pdf.  
 60.  See March 2013 Council Currents, NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, http://www 
.nationalhealthcouncil.org/pages/page-content.php?pageid=154 (last visited Jan. 
26, 2014).  
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legislative action on these types of reform measures is not unique,61 
it and its patient advocacy affiliates have now accomplished things 
that truly are unprecedented—by providing an innovative 
regulatory/IP interface for congressional consideration, a specific 
legislative proposal, and a cadre of supporters dedicated to 
bringing profound changes to the way in which research on new 
medicines is undertaken and copied versions of these new 
medicines come to market. 
Title II of House Bill 3116 would offer a dramatic 
simplification of the intellectual property framework that provides 
the economic rationale for investments to discover and develop 
new medicines.62 That novel framework would remove inadequate 
IP protection as a reason not to move forward to develop a new 
agent that appears to have promising potential as a new medicine. 
Additionally—and in a revolutionary departure from current law—
it would afford greater predictability, and vastly lower transaction 
costs, for securing regulatory approval for marketing copied 
versions of new medicines.63 An army of patent litigation lawyers 
could be put to pasture, were innovators able to make widespread 
use of the MODDERN Cures interface. 
The remainder of this article sets out the case for proceeding 
with the MODDERN Cures Act framework for defining—at least in 
relevant part—a future regulatory/IP interface for copied versions 
 
The NHC is again advocating for passage of the MODDERN Cures 
Act during this Congress. This game-changing legislation was initially 
crafted by the NHC and encourages the development of better 
diagnostic tools and the co-development of diagnostics and drugs to 
predict the safe, effective, and efficient use of medicines. The bill also 
creates a new class of drugs called ‘dormant therapies’—medicines that 
address conditions with limited or no treatment options—and 
establishes a predictable timeline for the introduction of low-cost 
generic equivalents. 
Id.  
 61.  See Robert A. Armitage, Creating the Best Medicines for Patients, Making 
Medicines More Affordable, but Not Limiting Research to Medicines with the Best 
Patents (2010), http://djf.typepad.com/files/armitage_paper.pdf (paper); Robert 
A. Armitage, Creating the Best Medicines for Patients, Making Medicines More 
Affordable, but Not Limiting Research to Medicines with the Best Patents 
(May 2010), http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/Biotechnology 
/Committee%20Documents/Committee%20Presentations/2010.Spring/Ohly.ppt 
(presentation). 
 62.  See infra Part III. 
 63.  See infra Part III. 
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of new medicines. That case begins with a background setting out 
the manner in which IP protection for new medicines has evolved 
in the Hatch-Waxman era.64 It then continues with the case to be 
made for sufficient IP protection to sustain a viable, research-based 
biopharmaceutical industry.65 The article concludes with the case 
for defining a common IP protection period of fifteen years.66 
III. A PRIMER ON THE POST–HATCH-WAXMAN EVOLUTION OF IP 
PROTECTION FOR NEW MEDICINES 
The “game-changing” nature of the MODDERN Cures Act 
regulatory/IP framework cannot be fully appreciated without an 
understanding of how IP protection for new medicines has 
operated historically and why the historically most important forms 
of IP protection for medicines—patents and trade secrets—have 
become increasingly problematic, even perverse, over the past two 
decades.  
A. An Overview of the Evolution of IP Protection for New Medicines 
As noted above, the most important forms of IP protection for 
new medicines have historically come from patents and trade 
secrets. The concept of data package protection as an additional 
and distinct form of IP protection for new medicines did not exist 
until it first emerged as a consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
Its existence—indeed importance—was validated in the Biosimilars 
Act, where data package protection plays a much more central and 
essential role. 
In the debates that led to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the consensus view was that the “gold standard” for IP 
protection for new medicines should reside in patents.67 Through a 
 
 64.  See infra Part III. 
 65.  See infra Part IV. 
 66.  See infra Part V. 
 67.  The importance of patents is apparent from the debates that led up to 
the patent term restoration provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Originally, 
Congress considered a separate bill that would have simply provided patent term 
restoration—without the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions that were responsible for 
the creation of the generic drug industry. S. 255, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 2892, 96th 
Cong. (1980). These separate efforts began by noting the unfairness of according 
the holders of medicine patents less than a full seventeen years of patent 
protection.  
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number of provisions, the economics of investing in the creation of 
new medicines was entrusted to the patent system. The 
underlying—but never tested—premise of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was that patents on new medicines could be routinely—and 
successfully—invoked to prevent making and selling copies of a 
patented medicine.68 The premise was that such protection would 
suffice to sustain the innovative industry from what otherwise would 
be the onslaught of price competition from copiers, which could 
come within a few years from the time the original version of the 
new medicine came onto the market.69 
Thirty years of experience under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
would suggest that the patent system was never fully up to this task. 
Moreover, in recent decades, patent protection has taken on an 
increasingly perverse character when it comes to protecting new 
medicines from premature generic competition. Patent protection 
becomes perverse when some of the best candidates for 
development as new medicines are left with some of the worst 
 
[Senate Bill 255] . . . merely corrects the anomaly under which the 
government grants a 17-year term of patent protection, but prohibits 
the patented product from being marketed while the patent life ticks 
away. There is no valid reason for a better mousetrap to receive 17 
years of patent protection and a lifesaving drug less than ten years. 
S. REP. No. 97-138, at 2 (1981). 
 68.  Prior to the Hatch-Waxman era, there were few reported cases that 
addressed the issues of validity and infringement of patents covering new 
medicines. Generic drug entry seldom occurred until years after all relevant 
patents on a medicine had expired. The originators of new medicines only very 
rarely were involved in enforcing patent rights against one another. The vast 
majority of new medicines coming to market, thus, never spawned even a single 
patent infringement lawsuit. 
 69.  Under Hatch-Waxman, absent patent protection, the only bar to 
immediately seeking approval to market of a generic copy is found in 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012). This provision sets up a five-year period in which such 
filings would be barred. The five-year period corresponds, roughly, to the period 
of time after the original version of a new medicine reaches the market during 
which a would-be copier can discern whether the new medicine is successful 
enough in the marketplace to merit developing a copy of the medicine, be able to 
secure a source of supply for the active ingredient, complete any research needed 
to develop a copied formulation that would behave similarly in a patient being 
administered the copied drug, complete the required testing needed to 
experimentally confirm the equivalence, and then pursue FDA approval for the 
copied version. During this nominal period of protection, few new medicines 
could ever hope to pay back to the originator the cost of creating them before 
generic drug entry could occur. 
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prospects for securing adequate patent protection. Patent 
perversity sits alongside other features inherent in the patent 
system that have exposed its frailty, at least when patents must stand 
as the exclusive vehicle for providing protection of the investments 
needed to create new medicines. The exact nature of the perversity 
and frailty is detailed below. 
Trade secret protection—in the pre–Hatch-Waxman era at 
least—constituted an effective adjunct to patenting as a protection 
for investments in innovation. As the originator of a new medicine 
conducts expansive testing of an experimental medicine, it can 
acquire trade secret protection with respect to the massive 
compilation of data on the experimental medicine’s effects.70 That 
protection can be perpetual; it can be sustained at least so long as 
such data remains unpublished and is otherwise maintained in 
secrecy. 
The rise of abbreviated approval pathways for biopharma-
ceutical products, however, effectively trumps traditional notions of 
trade secret rights that most other industry sectors enjoy. If a 
generic competitor can come to market without repeating the work 
that produced the compiled trade secret information, the 
economic value of the trade secret is nullified. 
In addition, growing requirements for data transparency with 
respect to an experimental medicine’s effects, once approved for 
marketing, inevitably diminish the effectiveness of trade secret 
protection. If all but the details of a new medicine’s effects are 
subject to public disclosure as a condition for gaining regulatory 
approval for the new medicine, there is little room left for trade 
secrecy to serve its traditional protective role. As patent protection 
 
 70.  Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A), the originator of a new medicine must 
amass, before seeking regulatory approval for a new drug, “full reports of 
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for 
use and whether such drug is effective in use.” These “full reports” of 
investigations exist at a level of detail, including patient-level detail, that typically 
and historically are not made publicly available—either by the sponsors of the 
studies or by regulatory agencies that are charged with reviewing the reports. 
Absent repeating the underlying clinical trials, there is no way such reports can be 
duplicated and—absent some abbreviated approval pathway—no way in which a 
competing product can come to market. Thus, the preclinical and clinical studies 
on a new medicine have historically met the definition for a valuable trade secret. 
They are compilations of information that produce economic value from not 
being generally known by competitors and derive significant economic value from 
access to the information. 
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has increasingly taken on a perverse character, and trade secrecy 
has been trumped by abbreviated approval pathways and demands 
for greater data transparency, data package protection has taken 
on a much greater significance as a means for protecting new 
medicines from copied versions obtaining regulatory approval to 
market.71 Even if this ascendant role for data package protection 
had not arisen by design, it would have come by default. 
The MODDERN Cures Act can be seen as an effort to optimize 
data package protection, obliterate any possible patent perversity, 
and obviate any need for reliance on trade secret protection of a 
new medicine’s safety and effectiveness data. By applying a 
common fifteen-year IP protection period to the originator’s 
relevant patents and its data package, the Act wholly eliminates the 
perversity with which the patent system can otherwise operate and 
assures protection from copying, whether the data package is held 
as a trade secret or fully available to the public. 
Given the common IP protection period for patents and the 
data package, the patent waiver requirements of the Act—a novel 
and unprecedented derogation from the originator’s patent 
rights—can be seen as a provision that is nonetheless fair to the 
originator of the new medicine. The waiver arises, if at all, only 
when the innovator requests the application of the Act. By securing 
the protection under the Act, the originator has the assurance of 
an extended period for IP protection. This voluntary waiver 
imposed only on those originators who elect the MODDERN Cures 
protection regime can be seen for what it is—a boon to the creator 
 
 71.  Heroic efforts have been undertaken in recent years, especially in the 
United States, to reform elements of the patent system to make it more 
transparent, objective, predictable, and simple. The aim of the reforms, in part, 
has been to make the patent system a more reliable source of protection for new 
medicine for which patents have been secured. See Robert A. Armitage, The 
America Invents Act: Will It Be the Nation’s Most Significant Patent Act Since 1790?, in 
PATENTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT (Deborah 
Nathan & Phyllis Skuplen eds., 2012), available at http://www.mofo.com 
/files/Uploads/Images/120206-Patents-21st-Century.pdf; Robert A. Armitage, 
Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1, 133 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation 
/armitage_pdf.pdf. Even with the success of patent reform efforts in recent years, 
there remain numerous legal hurdles that need to be surmounted before a patent 
can be found both valid and infringed and invoked to stop a copied version of a 
new medicine from entering the market. 
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and copier alike, neither of which will need to calibrate possible 
patent enforceability risks as part of its business planning. 
With this IP overview in hand, it is worth taking the above 
perspectives and drilling down into somewhat greater detail on IP 
protection for medicines, particularly the details of the evolution 
from the pre–Hatch-Waxman era to the post-Biosimilars Act era. 
B. Patent Protection and Patent Perversity 
The world of biopharmaceutical patenting changed in a 
significant manner on June 8, 1995. That was the date on which a 
new law, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), took effect 
and changed the measure for the term of protection for a patent. It 
replaced a standard that had been in operation for more than two 
hundred years72 and constituted a foundational premise for how 
the patent term restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
operated. 
Under the URAA, the term of protection for all new U.S. 
patent filings was set at a fixed term of years from the original, 
nonprovisional application date.73 In the post-URAA world, U.S. 
patents would expire at twenty years from the original, 
nonprovisional filing for the patent. What this meant, of course, 
was that the new twenty-year patent term would start to run down 
the date the patent was initially sought.74 Under the pre-URAA 
patent law, a seventeen-year patent term existed under which the 
 
 72.  See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (authorizing “letters patent 
to be made out in the name of the United States . . . granting to such petitioner or 
petitioners, his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns for any term not 
exceeding fourteen years”). The use of a fixed term from the date of grant of 
letters patents as the temporal measure of patent protection continued until 1995. 
 73.  The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, § 101, 
108 Stat. 4809, 4809 (1994), amended 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) to provide a 
twenty-year term of protection from the original filing date of an application for 
patent. Section 154(a)(3) provides that a provisional patent filing date is excluded 
from the twenty-year term, allowing a patent term to extend to twenty-one years 
from the earliest provisional patent filing date. The URAA implemented the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) text agreed as part of the 
1986–1994 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
 74.  See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), which in some situations can result in the 
adjustment of the patent term to account for delays in granting a patent. 
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date a patent eventually granted was used as the start of the 
seventeen-year protection period.75 The longer a patent took to be 
issued, the later in time the patent would expire. If a patent took 
ten to fifteen years to be processed, the patent would expire twenty-
seven to thirty-two years after the patent was initially sought. 
In most technology sectors—and under many fact situations—
there is little discernable economic consequence between the pre- 
and post-URAA patent term measures. However, given the manner 
in which biopharmaceutical patent filings must take place, and the 
manner in which the marketing of new medicines is regulated, the 
biopharmaceutical industry was uniquely—and negatively—
impacted by the URAA change in the measure of the patent term. 
As noted above, patent protection, when at its theoretical best, 
can be impeccable as a form of IP protection. This applies to 
almost any product in any technology sector. Patenting has the 
potential to provide effective and long-lived marketplace exclusivity 
for a patent-protected product, including all manner of copied 
versions of that product. For many innovative nonmedicinal 
products, patent protection can be initially sought as the product 
being engineered for commercialization. When the relevant 
patents on the new product are issued at or near the time the new 
product comes to market, it matters little how the patent term is 
calculated—pre-URAA seventeen years from grant or post-URAA 
twenty years from initial patent filing. Under either measure of 
patent term, the originator of the product may well secure no less 
than seventeen years of post-commercialization patent protection. 
The key to securing a long-lived patent in such situations is 
that the time between patent filing and commercialization ranges 
from a few months to a few years. For many nonmedicinal 
products, thus, the patent life under either measure of patent term 
will prove not only longer than seventeen years from the initial 
commercialization, but may typically be longer than the actual 
commercial lifespan of the patented product. In these situations, 
there is nothing perverse about patenting. Rather, patenting can 
form the full and complete economic predicate for proceeding to 
invest in the commercialization of the new product. 
The same potential for categorical, long-lived protection from 
copying through patents is—theoretically at least—available for new 
 
 75.  Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 154, 66 Stat. 792, 804 (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 154). 
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medicines, just as it is for other technology sectors. For a medicine 
incorporating a novel active ingredient, patents on the active 
ingredient can prevent any and all copied version of the medicine 
from coming to market. In a similar manner, patents can protect 
the methods of using a new medicine for its approved uses, thereby 
holding at bay the ability of a copyist to market a copied version of 
the medicine for the patented uses. 
However, in practice, much can go awry in perfecting 
adequate protection through patents. Patents on a medicine’s 
active ingredient and approved uses, even though they are 
theoretically capable of providing absolute protection from copying 
during the term of the patent, may fail to so operate in practice. A 
patent—no matter how strong and defensible it appears on its 
face—is subject to a set of legal and equitable defenses to its validity 
and enforceability.76 In patent infringement lawsuits, the complex 
nature of the patent law means that the patent owner can almost 
never be categorically certain of successfully asserting its patent 
infringement claims. 
Moreover, the ultimate viability of a patent as an effective IP 
tool is assessed only at the time a would-be copier surfaces and the 
originator of the new medicine brings an action to enforce the 
patent. The facts that may be fatal to the patent’s validity may only 
emerge during discovery after the patent litigation commences. 
This potential for prolonged uncertainty over the effectiveness of 
patent protection is not lost on the developer of a new medicine 
when attempting to calibrate the viability of the investment needed 
to create the new medicine. 
In addition, the grant of a patent is never assured. The 
standards for securing a patent are intentionally rigorous and 
inflexible.77 Simply because a medicine contains a never-before-
 
 76.  See, e.g., 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.01 (2013). 
 77.  The requirements for effective patent protection do not correlate with 
any of the requirements for securing regulatory approval to market a new 
medicine and the failure to meet any of the patentability requirements can either 
doom the ability to seek a valid patent or, if one has been sought, allow the patent 
to issue. A new drug must be shown to be “safe and effective” for the clinical uses 
for which it is approved. Under the current patent statute, Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), the uncorrelated 
requirements for patentability for a claimed invention in a patent filing can be 
boiled down to the following: 
 Sufficient differentiation from the prior art. “Prior art” is defined in a 
simple and transparent manner as subject matter that, at the time of 
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approved active ingredient or is to be sold for a never-before-
approved use does not guarantee that effective patent protection, 
once sought, can be secured for the medicine. 78 A patent that is 
 
an inventor’s patent filing, was already available to the public, or 
available from a previously-filed U.S. patent or published U.S. 
application for patent, subject to the inventor-friendly and 
collaboration-friendly “grace period” and “self-collision protection” 
provisions that have long been part of U.S. patent law.  
 Sufficient disclosure in the inventor’s patent filing to identify the 
embodiments of the claimed invention and enable them to be put to 
a specific, practical, and substantial use.  
 Sufficient definiteness in the inventor’s patent claims, to reasonably 
identify the subject matter being claimed from that not being 
claimed.  
 Sufficient concreteness in the subject matter claimed, such that the 
process or product being claimed is not excessively conceptual or 
otherwise abstract. 
Robert A. Armitage, The World’s First 21st Century Patent Law (Maybe): The Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, 4 LANDSLIDE, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 1, 1. 
 78.  See Benjamin J. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 503 (2009) (discussing implications of just two of the require-
ments, novelty and nonobviousness). 
   The role of the patent system in promoting pharmaceutical 
innovation is widely seen as a tremendous success story. This view 
overlooks a serious shortcoming in the drug patent system: the 
standards by which drugs are deemed unpatentable under the novelty 
and nonobviousness requirements bear little relationship to the social 
value of those drugs or the need for a patent to motivate their 
development. If the idea for a drug is not novel or is obvious—perhaps 
because it was disclosed in an earlier publication or made to look 
obvious by recent scientific advances-then it cannot be patented. Yet, 
the mere idea for a drug alone is generally of little value to the public. 
Without clinical trials proving the drug’s safety and efficacy, which is a 
prerequisite for approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and acceptance by the medical community, that drug is unlikely to 
benefit the public. Given the immense investment needed to fund 
clinical trials on drugs and the ability of generic manufacturers to rely 
on those tests to secure regulatory approval for their own products, 
pharmaceutical companies are rarely willing to develop drugs without 
patent protection. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements 
make no concession for the development costs of inventions and thus 
cause patents to be withheld from drugs that are unlikely to reach the 
public without that protection. This gap in the patent system for drugs 
has created a pervasive problem in the pharmaceutical industry, 
causing firms to regularly screen their drugs during the research-and-
development process and discard ones with weak patent protection. 
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never issued, of course, is a patent that can never be enforced 
against a copier of a new medicine. 
There are important medicines that will never enjoy effective 
patent protection because no patents were ever even sought on the 
new medicine. Great new medicines, no matter how outstanding 
their clinical merit, do not automatically qualify for patent 
protection. However, by far the most perverse aspect of the patent 
system, arises from the more pervasive inability under the post-
URAA patent law to reliably secure long-lived patent protection for 
the new medicines that are most deserving of—and most in need 
of—protection from copied versions of those medicines being 
approved for marketing. Perversely, many of the most significant 
and important new medicines will typically be saddled with the 
most short-lived patent protection. 
Because the patent law in effect from 1790 to 1995 determined 
the patent expiration date based upon the issue date of the patent, 
if a patent on a new medicine did not actually issue until at or after 
the time at which the new medicine was approved for marketing, 
the effective patent life for the medicine could be a full seventeen 
years or even longer.79 Using the same formula, a patent issuing less 
than three years before a new medicine was approved for 
marketing would have a patent life of more than fourteen years. 
Since nothing in the pre-1995 patent law required that the 
patent owner make undo haste to secure the issuance of a patent, a 
patent owner could readily achieve fifteen years of patent life—or 
even longer—even in situations where a new medicine took fifteen 
years or more to go through the regulatory testing and review 
process. 
Under today’s patent law, because the most relevant (and most 
significant) patents must typically be sought at the earliest point in 
 
The harm to the public from the loss of these drugs is potentially quite 
significant. Congress can easily avoid this problem by ensuring that the 
successful completion of the FDA’s rigorous clinical-trial process is 
rewarded with a lengthy exclusivity period enforced by the FDA.  
Id. at 503. 
 79.  Teresa Riordan, Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at 2, available at 1995 
WLNR 3836838 (“Under the old system, a patent was valid for 17 years from the 
date it was issued. Under the new system, a patent is valid 20 years from the date of 
application. The change, while seemingly subtle, has enormous ramifications for 
patent attorneys and inventors and the strategies they pursue to maximize patent 
protection.”). See infra note 101, discussing the potential for patent protection 
lasting more than seventeen years. 
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the drug development process, an inverse relationship is created 
between the length of testing required to get to market and the 
available patent protection once marketing approval is secured. In 
other words, the longer time period required for the necessary 
testing to bring a new medicine to market, the shorter the effective 
patent life that would remain for these most important patents 
protecting the new medicine. The more difficult—and thus 
longer—the road to the regulatory approval of a new medicine, the 
shorter the remaining patent life on the date the new medicine 
makes its first commercial sale. 
A medicine can be more difficult to bring to market for any 
one of several reasons. Each of these reasons correlates to the 
potential importance of the medicine to clinical practice. In this 
case a direct relationship applies—the more difficult the path to 
gain regulatory approval for a medicine, the greater the potential 
breakthrough the new therapy typically represents. Sometimes 
medicine makers seek approval of a new medicine for a disease that 
has never before been successfully treated with a drug—or seek to 
treat a disease through a new mechanism of action that has never 
been successfully employed. In other situations, the use for which 
the new medicine is being investigated is for a chronic condition 
rather than an acute episode. Similarly, medicines may be studied 
for their ability to prevent a disease rather than simply treat the 
disease once it is diagnosed. In each of these situations, the route 
to approval of the new medicine will almost certainly prove to be a 
more prolonged one. The required studies that are needed to 
establish the merit of the medicine for a chronic, unprecedented, 
or prophylactic use typically last longer, often much longer, than 
for medicines where these complications are absent. 
Because the only patents that have a realistic potential of 
providing marketplace exclusivity—patents directed to the 
medicine’s active ingredient and its medicinal uses—must be 
sought early in the process of the development of a new medicine, 
the patent term continues to run on these patents throughout the 
medicine’s development process. By the time the medicines that 
are the most difficult to develop—and are of potentially the 
greatest importance to patients if successfully developed—finally 
achieve regulatory approval, the remaining patent life may be 
highly limited. In some situations, it may be totally exhausted.80 
 
 80.  Discussed infra Part III.E are the so-called “patent term restoration” 
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No one would intentionally design an IP system for the 
protection of new medicines with a relatively longer IP protection 
period for experimental medicines that have the shorter and 
simpler pathway to regulatory approval and relatively shorter IP 
protection periods for those seeking to develop the most novel, 
unprecedented, and risky therapies. The very medicines that 
need—and merit—the greater intellectual property incentive to 
secure the investments needed to create them are the same 
medicines that such perverse IP rules would disadvantage, making 
it less likely that investing to create them would be a sound or a 
wise investment. Patients, of course, would like access to the best 
medicines, not medicines that happen to have the best patents. 
The best medicines, prospectively at least, may well be those for 
which patent protection might be so transient upon receiving 
regulatory approval that it cannot serve as a basis to justify the 
investment needed to create the medicine. 
As a result, today, the patent protection of medicines, standing 
by itself, particularly under the constraint of the URAA’s twenty-
year, filing-based patent term, is at best flawed. Patent protection 
under the post-URAA patent law will inevitably operate perversely. 
To the extent patents serve as the chief form of expected IP 
protection for new medicines, the patent law would inevitably steer 
the originators of new medicines in the direction of those with the 
best prospects for patents, irrespective of whether they would 
represent the best in new medicines. 
C. Data Transparency and Abbreviated Approval Pathways Take a Toll 
on Trade Secrecy 
Trade secret protection can exist with respect to the detailed 
reports of the studies on a new medicine that are necessary to gain 
regulatory approval for marketing.81 Such details are typically not 
made public by the sponsor of the investigations into the effects of 
the medicine. However, trade secret protection, the detailed data 
that defines a new medicine’s effects, sits in unavoidable tension 
with the public interest in a full understanding of the new 
medicine’s properties. The maintenance of trade secret protection, 
surrounding the data used to demonstrate the merit of a medicine, 
 
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act that, on account of their inherent 
limitations, tend to ameliorate, but not eliminate the perversity of the patent law. 
 81.  See supra Part III.A. 
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is seen by many as contrary to the public interest in full 
transparency with respect to information used to determine that a 
new therapy is safe and effective.82 
Such information is, at least, potentially of relevance to a 
patient in deciding what therapy is best. It is of a potentially similar 
importance to a physician grappling with a difficult prescribing 
choice for an individual patient. In addition, the greater the 
secrecy maintained as to the effects of a medicine, the lesser the 
ability of independent entities to sift through the clinical data and 
either confirm or dispute the interpretation of the data being 
advanced by the medicine’s originator.83 This same consideration 
applies as well to the conclusions reached by regulatory authorities 
in deciding that a medicine can be safely and effectively used. 
Thus, proponents of full data transparency, at the expense of 
trade secrecy, assert that it can produce greater confidence in the 
appropriateness of a new therapy reaching the market—or it can 
produce a more sober sense of caution in using a new therapy. 
Either way, the policy of requiring ever-greater disclosure of the 
preclinical and clinical trial results leading to the approval to 
market a new medicine is unlikely to abate.84 As ever-greater 
transparency with respect to a new medicine’s effects has been 
pursued by regulatory authorities, the ability to assert meaningful 
trade secret protection in the preclinical and clinical investigations 
that result in the regulatory approval of a new medicine has 
lessened. Today, at least for some types of new medicines, 
information on the medicine’s effects that is published in 
 
 82.  See generally EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, EMA/110196/2006, EUROPEAN 
MEDICINES AGENCY POLICY ON ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS (RELATED TO MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN AND VETERINARY USE) 3 (2010), available at http://www.ema 
.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2010/11/WC500099473.pdf.  
 83.  Erick H. Turner, How to Access and Process FDA Drug Approval Packages for 
Use in Research, BMJ (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj 
.f5992#xref-ref-1-1.  
   Reporting bias leads to an overestimation of drug efficacy and 
underestimation of drug harms, but its effects can be mitigated by 
using unpublished data from drug regulatory agencies. Such data can 
be useful to clinicians interested in going beyond the product labeling 
and published literature. By comparing drug regulatory data with the 
published literature, researchers can uncover reporting bias . . . . 
Id. 
 84.  See Peter Doshi & Tom Jefferson, The First 2 Years of the European Medicines 
Agency’s Policy on Access to Documents: Secret No Longer, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 380, 
380–82 (2013). 
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connection with the new medicine’s regulatory approval leaves 
little to the imagination with respect to the properties of a new 
medicine. 
As more detailed information on a medicine becomes public, 
assertion of trade secret rights based upon clinical trial results is 
unavailing to the extent the publicly available information is in fact 
sufficient to reach a justifiable scientific conclusion that any copied 
version would be equally safe and effective in patients as the 
original version of the medicine—at least so long as the copied 
formulation contains the identical85 active ingredient and 
approximates the pattern of absorption and distribution in the 
patient that is achieved by the original version of the medicine.86 
All of these considerations pale in comparison to the impact 
that abbreviated regulatory approval pathways have had on trade 
secret protection. If a copier need not provide the detailed reports 
of preclinical and clinical investigations required for the original 
version of a new medicine to be approved, the fact that such data is 
maintained as confidential information is of no significance. The 
secret information affords the originator no residual competitive 
value or advantage if regulatory authorities are free to consider the 
 
 85.  Under the Biosimilars Act, a copied or biosimilar version of a biologic 
product will have active ingredients that are “highly similar,” rather than 
“identical,” to the active ingredients in the originator’s product. “[A] biological 
product may be demonstrated to be ‘biosimilar’ if data show that, among other 
things, the product is ‘highly similar’ to an already-approved biological product.” 
Drugs, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval 
process/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/therapeutic 
biologicapplications/biosimilars/default.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 86.  The extent of the “data package” that becomes publicly available at the 
time of FDA approval runs from the dozens to hundreds of pages of 
documentation: 
   FDA Approval Packages contain the research information on new 
drugs or biologics submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) by drug sponsors that has been analyzed and 
critiqued by experts at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) or the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). 
Once a new drug or biologic is approved for marketing, the FDA is 
required to make the Approval Package available to the public. . . . 
Approval Packages are typically large, unwieldy documents ranging 
from 50 to 1500 pages. 
FDA Drug Approval Packages, U. IOWA DIVISION DRUG INFO SERVICES, http://www 
.uiowa.edu/idis/FDA_Approval_Overview.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
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existence of such data when deciding if a copied version of the 
medicine to which it relates can be approved. 
Given that patent protection for new medicines may be 
perverse and trade secret protection is moving into decline, if not 
irrelevancy, the future of IP protection for new medicines may 
increasingly move to the third form of IP protection—providing 
the originator of a data package containing the preclinical and 
clinical testing for a new medicine a protection period sufficient to 
assure that investments needed to create a new medicine have a 
reasonable prospect of earning back a fair return before a copied 
version of the new medicine can be approved on the basis of the 
contents of the originator’s data package. 
D. Data Package Protection Bars Regulatory Approval of Copies of the 
Original Version of New Medicines Absent Submitting a Complete 
Data Package 
Data package protection bars the regulatory approval of a new 
medicine for marketing under an abbreviated regulatory approval 
pathway except in the situation where the copier has repeated 
investigations of the type required to gain approval of the original 
version of the new medicine or, alternatively, has secured a right to 
reference the originator’s investigations. This type of protection 
has effect, therefore, whenever the copier of the new medicine 
attempts to take advantage of an abbreviated regulatory approval 
pathway without repeating—or securing a right of reference to—
the studies required for the approval of the original medicines. 
A data package protection period can arise from a moratorium 
placed on the filing of an abbreviated regulatory approval 
application.87 Self-evidently, the moratorium period barring the 
filing of an abbreviated regulatory approval application necessarily 
affords a minimum time period when an abbreviated regulatory 
filing cannot be approved. The Hatch-Waxman Act, for the first 
time in history, provided data package protection independently 
from the existence of any trade secret protection applicable to 
 
 87.  The moratorium periods are typically much shorter than the data 
package protection period. Under the Biosimilars Act, the moratorium period 
under the biosimilars pathway is four years. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (2006). An 
analogous moratorium period on the filing of an ANDA under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act is four or five years, depending upon whether a patent challenge has been 
made. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012). 
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originator’s clinical and preclinical data.88 Even in situations where 
all the safety and effectiveness information relating to a new 
medicine had entered the public domain, the Act imposed a five-
year moratorium period when an abbreviated regulatory approval 
application based upon the publicly available information could 
not be filed.89 This provision had the effect of recognizing the 
originator’s data package as an intellectual property right that was 
entirely separate and independent from trade secret rights. 
As a confirmation of the independence of data package 
protection as a separate form of IP protection from trade secrecy, 
this new form of IP protection was specifically applied to the so-
called “paper new drug application” (paper NDA) provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.90 A paper NDA can be filed based entirely 
upon public information concerning a new medicine’s safety and 
effectiveness, but cannot be filed until after the moratorium on 
paper NDA filings has ended.91 
Aside from its role in assuring that data package protection 
represented a form of IP protection, paper NDAs have a limited 
use in securing marketing approval for copied versions of new 
medicines. By far the predominate role is played by the second of 
the two abbreviated pathways under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
ANDA provisions.92 The ANDA provisions effectively superseded 
the need for a paper NDA to secure regulatory approval of a 
generic drug, because the ANDA pathway is available whether or 
not the originator’s data package was wholly public, maintained as 
a trade secret, or fell somewhere between these two extremes.93 
In making the ANDA pathway available, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act effectively negated the value of the trade secret protection in 
the safety and efficacy date related to the new medicine, at least 
once the applicable moratorium period ended. Considering the 
 
 88.  Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1590, 1595 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j)). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (“An application . . . for which the investi-
gations . . . relied upon by the applicant for approval of the application were not 
conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a 
right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigations were 
conducted” were permitted to be filed, but only after the expiration of a specified 
moratorium period.). 
 91.  See id. 
 92.  Id. § 355(j). 
 93.  Id. 
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paper NDA and ANDA pathways as a whole, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
assured that the originator of a new medicine was no longer 
required to maintain trade secrecy to have IP protection against 
copied versions of the new medicine being approved until after the 
end of the moratorium period. However, once the moratorium 
period ended, the originator of a new medicine was not guaranteed 
that maintaining trade secret protection for the regulatory data 
would have any economic significance; any postmoratorium trade 
secret rights that survived could be effectively nullified under the 
ANDA pathway. 
What the Hatch-Waxman ANDA pathway provided was 
tantamount to a compulsory right to reference the secret content 
of the safety and effectiveness data package of the originator of a 
new medicine once the moratorium period ended.94 The Hatch-
Waxman Act thus set “data package protection” limits on securing 
the approval of copied versions of new medicines, even if no 
relevant patents existed—and irrespective of whether the original 
data package on which the approval of the new medicine was made 
was entirely public or was maintained as a trade secret.95 At the 
same time, it effectively stripped away trade secret protection in the 
originator’s preclinical and clinical data package by effectively 
treating a generic drug application as though it contained the right 
to reference it, in lieu of repeating the studies needed for the 
regulatory approval of the original version of the new medicine.96 
 
 94.  Because the application of the Hatch-Waxman Act was not entirely 
prospective in its application, it raised an unavoidable Takings Clause issue under 
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Someone challenging the law 
could have contended that  
any proposal allowing the generic applicant to draw upon data 
submitted by previous applicants, or to rely on information within the 
knowledge and experience of the agency that had been generated by 
previous applicants, would allow the ‘use’ of property for a public 
purpose without just compensation. Because previously submitted data 
might, in some forms, constitute trade secrets—a form of intellectual 
property— . . . any disclosure or use of the information by the agency 
would constitute a taking for which ‘just compensation’ is required by 
the Constitution. 
John C. Yoo, Takings Issues in the Approval of Generic Biologics, 60 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 33, 34–35 (2005). No such challenge was ever made and, after thirty years, has 
become moot. The issue has been addressed in connection with the Biosimilars 
Act. 
 95.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii). 
 96.  Id. § 355(b), (j). 
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Overall, therefore, the Hatch-Waxman Act had the effect of 
recognizing that this new form of intellectual property right it had 
created—data package protection—played an independent and 
essential role in the balance between incentives for innovation and 
market access for copiers. That is, data package protection was 
provided even for medicines with no relevant patent protection 
whatsoever and for which the relevant data on safety and efficacy 
were in the public domain. 
When relevant patents do exist, data package protection under 
the Hatch-Waxman Act would effectively exist so long as relevant 
patent protection existed. The Act’s “patent linkage” provisions 
were designed to secure this result.97 The Act then provided a 
further provision that was designed to assure more adequate data 
package protection, by assuring more adequate patent protection.98 
This new mechanism was “patent term restoration.” 
E. Hatch-Waxman “Patent Term Restoration” Ameliorates, but Does Not 
Eliminate, Patent Perversity 
By any measure, the “patent term restoration” provisions 
constitute another historic element of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
Patent term restoration permits the term of a relevant patent for a 
new medicine to be extended based upon the time consumed in 
gaining regulatory approval for new medicine.99 The regulatory 
period, codified in the Hatch-Waxman Act’s restoration provision, 
is based upon the period required for clinical testing of the 
medicine and the time during which the originator’s NDA is 
pending approval by the FDA. The patent term restoration 
provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act contain exclusions and 
exceptions that prevent a full restoration of the marketing time lost 
to the R&D efforts, resulting in a statute that is remarkably 
complex.100 
 
 97.  See infra Part III.F. 
 98.  Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–1603 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)). 
 99.  35 U.S.C. § 156. 
 100.  See id. The patent term restoration provisions limit the period of 
extension to five additional years of patent life. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A). The actual 
period of extension is limited to the “regulatory review period,” but only one-half 
of the time during which a medicine was being investigated clinically can count 
toward the five-year period. Id. § 156(c)(2). The preclinical testing period is 
entirely disregarded. No matter how many patents might be relevant to a new 
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In spite of all these complexities, the upshot of the patent term 
restoration provisions, at least in the context in which they were 
originally enacted in 1984, was that the originator of a new 
medicine would have a reasonable expectation in many situations 
of securing fourteen years of restored patent life and, 
consequently, the patent-linked “data package protection period” 
that would result would be a matching fourteen-year period. What 
made the fourteen-year expectation a reasonable one in most 
situations was the interplay between the patent term restoration 
opportunity and the opportunity for delayed patent expiration 
dates under the seventeen-year patent term. 
It was not unknown, for example, for patent term restoration 
to be unavailable for one or more of the most significant patents on 
a new medicine, because the remaining patent life for such patents 
was greater than 14 years at the time of the new medicine’s 
approval. Indeed, there are examples of patent term restoration 
being entirely unavailable because no relevant patents on the new 
medicine providing less than 14 years of post-approval patent life 
ever existed.101 
Under the pre-URAA seventeen-year patent term, the Hatch-
Waxman patent term restoration provisions enabled a patent that 
 
medicine, only a single patent can be extended and, if a patent was granted an 
extension, it cannot be extended a second time. Id. § 156(c)(4). Finally, the 
period of extension cannot exceed fourteen years from the date regulatory 
approval was secured for the new medicine. See id. § 156(c)(3). 
 101.  One example of how the pre-URAA patent law could operate to assure 
patent protection of greater than 14 years can be found in the relevant patents for 
the medicine EPOGEN. According to the medicine’s sponsor, Amgen Inc., 
EPOGEN was first approved for marketing in 1989. Amgen was unable to seek any 
patent term restoration because no EPOGEN-related patents were ever issued that 
had a post-approval patent life of less than fourteen years. Amgen’s patents most 
relevant to EPOGEN were based on a patent filing initially made on December 13, 
1983 (United States Application Serial Number 06/561,024). Had Amgen’s patent 
filings been limited to the URAA’s 20-year term, each of the relevant patents based 
upon this initial patent filing would have expired before the end of 2003. 
However, among the patents that ultimately based on the 1983 patent application 
was U.S. Patent 5,547,933, which was granted on August 20, 1996 and was entitled 
to a 17-year patent term expiring in 2013. Thus without any patent term 
restoration benefit under the Hatch-Waxman Act, EPOGEN was able to take 
advantage of the pre-URAA patent law to achieve a 24-year effective patent life. 
See Amgen Inc. Annual Report (Form 10–K) 11 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/318154/000119312512086670/d24142
0d10k.htm (last visited on Mar. 26, 2014). 
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was issued more than three years prior to the date a new medicine 
was approved to effectively “top off” the patent term to the 
fourteen-year mark. As an example, for a patent issuing under the 
pre-URAA patent law no more than three years before the 
originator’s NDA was filed, the originator was assured of a 
fourteen-year patent life––even if the FDA took an atypically long 
five years to decide to approve the NDA. The date on which the 
patent was initially sought would make no difference to the 
calculation. 
In contrast, the post-URAA law would frustrate the “topping 
off” function of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s patent term restoration 
provisions. If a post-URAA patent was initially sought a decade 
before the NDA filing, the post-URAA patent law would limit the 
restored patent term to twelve years instead of fourteen years if the 
FDA then required a three-year period to approve the NDA once 
filed––only with a one-year FDA review period could a fourteen-
year patent life be achieved. If the patent was initially sought fifteen 
years before the NDA filing, then only a seven-year restored patent 
term would remain––one-half of the restored patent life that would have 
been achieved under the pre-URAA patent law––should the FDA take the 
same three year-period to approve the new medicine. 
After the 1994 enactment of the URAA’s twenty-year patent 
term, the assorted limitations contained in the patent term 
restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were instantly 
transformed into what might be characterized as serious flaws. 
Absent the interplay between the issue-based patent term and the 
patent term restoration opportunity, the fourteen-year limitation 
on Hatch-Waxman patent term restoration effectively became a 
ceiling, not a floor on available patent protection for many new 
medicines. As a result, the Hatch-Waxman patent term restoration 
provisions as they operate today are at best able to moderate, but 
not remediate the perversity of patent protection. However, even 
with patent term restoration, many of the potentially best new 
medicines face the prospect of being saddled with the dimmest 
prospects for adequate patent protection. 
The URAA changes to the patent term represented, in 
hindsight at least, a lost opportunity to remedy, rather than 
reinforce, the perversity that results when the most difficult and 
risky efforts at creating new medicines are rewarded with shorter 
and more variable patent lives. In resetting the patent term 
calculation from a protection based on the patent issue date to 
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protection based on the original patent filing date, Congress might 
have concurrently acted to reset the Hatch-Waxman patent term 
restoration calculation to a fixed period of fourteen years from the 
original regulatory approval date for the new medicine. 
All the complexity of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act’s patent 
term restoration provisions could have been eliminated by simply 
setting the terms of the originator’s relevant patents to expire at 
fourteen years from the date of regulatory approval. Given the “fast 
track” nature of the adoption of the twenty-year patent term, there 
was neither the time nor the opportunity for Congress to 
accomplish this objective.102 
Nothing, of course, would prevent Congress taking such a 
remedial action now. The MODDERN Cures Act represents, at least 
for medicines being studied for unmet medical needs, such a 
remedial step. The MODDERN Cures Act not only eliminates the 
possibility for patent perversity but goes a step farther. By setting a 
fixed and certain fifteen-year IP protection period from the date of 
the original regulatory approval of a new medicine, all uncertainty 
and variability in the protection for the original version of a new 
medicine and market entry for copied versions is ended––both for 
the originator and the copier.103 
F. Hatch-Waxman “Patent Linkage”––A Patent-Dependent Data 
Package Protection Period Injects Patent Perversity into Data Package 
Protection 
The Hatch-Waxman Act tied together the concepts of data 
package protection and patent protection through a then-novel 
“patent linkage” mechanism. There is a virtual maze of provisions 
in the Hatch-Waxman Act that implement the patent linkage 
provisions. Effectively, the linkage provisions place a bar on 
approval for marketing of either a paper NDA or an ANDA until 
each of the originator’s relevant patents on the new medicine have 
expired.104 The only exception that applies is the situation where a 
 
 102.  For a discussion of the limitations on congressional consideration of the 
1994 changes to the patent law due to the “fast track” authority of the President to 
conclude trade agreements, see Natalie R. Minter, Fast Track Procedures: Do They 
Infringe upon Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL’Y 107 
(1995). 
 103.  See H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 201(i)(4)(B) (2013). 
 104.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2), (j)(2) (2012). 
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patent is successfully challenged by the copier.105 In brief, the “data 
package protection period” becomes the same as the patent 
protection period, at least for most patented medicines. 
In hindsight at least, the Hatch-Waxman Act could justify its 
relatively transient data patent moratorium periods that relate to 
the filing of paper NDAs and ANDAs, because of the linkage 
provisions that provide the actual marketing approvals for generic 
copies would await for what might typically be a fourteen-year (or 
sometimes longer) patent life for the new medicine. In this 
manner, at least under the 1984 incarnation of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, copied versions of new drugs would appear in the marketplace 
only after the originator of the new medicine had enjoyed a period 
that, on its face at least, was reasonably sufficient to recover the 
investment made in creating it. 
As noted above, when the URAA changes to the patent laws 
made the patent term restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act less effective, it made the patent linkage provisions 
correspondingly less effective. In effect, the magnification of patent 
perversity through the new filing-based patent term was imported 
into the data package protection provisions under the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Just as patent protection periods have more 
uncertain and more variable protection terms, so do the Hatch-
Waxman’s data package protection provisions. The Biosimilars Act, 
among other departures from the Hatch-Waxman Act, dispensed 
with any patent linkage provisions. It employs a different structure 
for data package protection, which the proponents of the Act 
apparently believed would obviate the need for any type of linkage. 
Expanding the data package protection as it relates to the approval 
of copied versions of biologic medicines to at least twelve years 
apparently formed the justification for dispensing with any form of 
patent linkage. 
Again, the MODDERN Cures Act takes the Biosimilars Act one 
step farther. The data package protection period of fifteen years––
and the complete alignment of the period of patent protection to 
 
 105.  The copier was required to certify, with respect to each relevant, 
unexpired patent of the originator of the new medicine whether the copier was 
seeking approval upon the patent expiration date or was prepared to challenge 
the applicability of the patent to the copied version of the new medicine. These 
two options are set out in 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(III)–(IV), commonly and 
respectively referred to as the copier’s “Paragraph III” and “Paragraph IV” 
certifications. 
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an identical fifteen-year period––moots the need for any form of 
patent linkage. 
G. The Hatch-Waxman “Generic Drug Monopoly Period” 
The last of the pioneering IP provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was yet another consequence of the decision to link the data 
package protection period to the patent life in an effort to assure 
an adequate aggregate protection period before approving copied 
versions of a new medicine under an abbreviated regulatory 
approval pathway. This last pioneering feature created a so-called 
“generic drug monopoly period” in which one or more generic 
drug manufacturers might preclude all their fellow generic 
competitors from the market during a 180-day period.106 
Over the past thirty years, the generic drug monopoly period 
may well have produced more profits for generic drug 
manufacturers than from sales of generic drugs otherwise. The 
marketing monopoly’s historic role as a driver of generic drug 
industry profits was, however, highly attenuated by the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003.107 
Today, all generic drug manufacturers that submit patent 
challenges on the first day permitted for doing so108 now share in 
the “monopoly.” For a typical new medicine, somewhere between 
five and fifteen generic drug manufacturers may qualify as so-called 
“first filers.”109 Having that many competitors sharing a monopoly 
period is, of course, no monopoly at all. While this aspect of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, however flawed, was clearly well intentioned, it 
has long outlived any usefulness that it might have had. From the 
 
 106.  Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), the period is referred to as the 
“180-day exclusivity period.”  
 107.  See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in 
scattered provisions of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 108.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (“[A]n [abbreviated new drug] appli-
cation may be submitted . . . after the expiration of four years from the date of the 
approval of the [original version of the new drug] if it contains a certification of 
patent invalidity or noninfringement described in [Paragraph IV].”). 
 109.  See id. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb). The statute refers to the “first filers” as 
“first applicants” and defines a first applicant as “an applicant that, on the first day 
on which a substantially complete application containing a certification described 
in [Paragraph IV] is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially 
complete application that contains and lawfully maintains a [Paragraph IV] 
certification.” Id.  
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beginning of the Hatch-Waxman era, it has routinely induced 
patent challenges on the key patents that the originators of new 
medicines have relied upon to invest in the creation of the new 
medicine––rather than being confined to its original purpose as a 
mechanism to challenge questionable, secondary patents. 
In other situations, it has provided an unnecessary incentive to 
challenge patents that would have been challenged with the same 
vigor and to the same extent even absent any such an incentive. 
Lastly, it has spawned an unseemly practice of “patent settlements” 
that, while defended by some antitrust specialists, has been roundly 
criticized in antitrust policy circles and elsewhere.110 
Unsurprisingly, just as the Biosimilars Act avoided patent 
linkage, it similarly avoided instituting any analog to the generic 
drug monopoly period. Under the MODDERN Cures Act, such a 
monopoly period is unnecessary. There will be no relevant patents 
whose enforceability will extend beyond the date when the data 
package protection period has ended. 
H. MODDERN Cures: One Answer to the Emerging Issues with the 
Regulatory/IP Interface Under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Whatever its possible shortcomings, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
has served well the intent of its legislative sponsors to create a 
vibrant generic drug industry that would exist alongside an equally 
vibrant industry committed to the discovery and development of 
new medicines. Today, however, neither the copier industry nor 
the originator industry looks much like its respective 1984 
counterpart. The respective market shares of the innovator 
industry and the copier industry have essentially reversed—the vast 
majority of drugs consumed today are copied versions, not the 
original. 
While the Hatch-Waxman Act has left both industries with 
business models that have thus far proven viable, warning signs 
exist that suggest the Hatch-Waxman Act may not fulfill its 1984 
intent indefinitely into the future. Unlike the 1984 version of the 
Act, the contemporary version is more deeply infected with patent 
perversity. This undercuts its ability to provide the consistent 
promise of the fourteen-year protection period for new medicines 
that was originally afforded through the combination of a 
seventeen-year patent term based upon the issue date of the patent 
 
 110.  See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
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and the ability to use the patent term restoration provisions of 
Hatch-Waxman to “top off” patent term for patents issuing too far 
in advance of the marketing approval for a new medicine. As noted 
earlier, by tying data package protection provisions to patent 
expiration, the Hatch-Waxman Act simply imported patent 
perversity into its data package protection provisions.111 
One possibility for improving the Hatch-Waxman Act might be 
for the Act to morph into a law akin to the Biosimilars Act. Another 
possibility might be for Congress to consider the missed 
opportunity from the 1994 patent law changes to simply reset the 
patent term for the relevant patents of the originator of a new 
medicine to a fixed period of fourteen, seventeen or even twenty 
years from the date a new medicine was originally approved––much 
like the post-1994 patent term runs for twenty years from the date a 
patent application was originally filed.112 
 
 111.  See supra Part III.F. 
 112.  An analytical framework has been developed to better understand the 
economic rationale for measuring IP protection periods from the date of 
commercialization. Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? 
Evidence from Cancer Trials 1, 14 (Sept. 5, 2013), available at http://economics 
.mit.edu/files/8651, advances the proposition that filing-based patent terms have 
negative, distortive impacts on making R&D investment decisions that could be 
addressed through a commercialization-based measure for patent term, such as 
that suggested in the below text: 
Since in many industries firms are effectively compelled to file patents 
at the time of discovery (“invention”) rather than at the time of first 
sale (“commercialization”), legally fixed patent terms [measured from 
patent filing dates] generate variable effective patent terms: inventions 
that commercialize at the time of invention receive a full twenty-year 
patent term, whereas inventions that take longer to commercialize 
realize a shorter effective patent term. In the extreme, patents offer no 
incentive to develop technologies that would take longer than twenty 
years to commercialize. Thus, under a fixed patent term, research and 
development (R&D) investments may be distorted away from 
technologies with long time lags between invention and 
commercialization. . . . 
. . . . 
   . . . Suppose that the length of the patent term must be fixed, but 
that the patent clock can start either at invention or 
commercialization. Given any patent term that runs from the date of 
invention, there exists a patent term that runs from the date of 
commercialization that strictly increases social welfare. In particular, 
the optimal patent term that runs from the date of commercialization 
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Yet another possibility, of course, would be for Congress to 
enact the MODDERN Cures Act, with its fixed and certain fifteen-
year IP protection period inclusive of both patent protection and 
data package protection periods. For medicines that meet its 
qualifications, it would assure that the prospect of transient, 
questionable, or nonexistent patent protection would no longer 
imperil the ability to invest in the testing required to bring a 
promising new experimental medicine to market. 
To gain a fuller understanding of why this type of a unified 
approach to the regulatory/IP interface would merit serious 
consideration, it is useful to undertake a detailed analysis of the 
economic and competitive environments in which new medicines 
have historically been protected from copying––and how those 
factors have changed in ways that make the MODDERN Cures 
approach a compelling model. 
IV. INVESTMENTS IN MAKING NEW MEDICINES DEPEND UPON IP 
PROTECTION SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY SUSTAINED, HIGH RISK 
INVESTMENTS CAPABLE OF YIELDING COMMENSURATE RETURNS 
The prospect of enjoying adequate IP protection has become a 
necessary predicate for making the investment needed to create a 
new medicine. Once a new medicine is approved and reaches the 
market, it is essential to the ability of the medicine’s originator to 
undertake the follow-on educational and marketing investments 
that are required to develop a commercial market for those 
medicines. 
For an innovation-focused business model to have any hope of 
survival, IP protection needs to serve as a bulwark against relatively 
inexpensive copied versions of new medicines coming to market 
during the limited period before such IP protection vanishes. The 
business model for a generic manufacturer permits copied versions 
of the most valuable and life-changing medicines to be profitably 
sold into the marketplace at a nominal cost. For consumers, it has 
made a month’s supply of hundreds of miracle medicines less costly 
than a daily trip to Starbucks.113 
 
is superior to the optimal patent term running from the date of 
invention. 
 113.  The average price of Starbucks latte (Venti size) exceeds $4. See Starbucks 
Latte (Venti size) Prices, HUMUCH?, http://www.humuch.com/prices/Starbucks 
-Latte-Venti-size/_/819 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). This compares with the 
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The economic thesis for creating the new generic drug 
industry with these characteristics was as simple as it is compelling. 
The research-based biopharmaceutical industry is the consummate 
high-risk business, both in its efforts to create new medicines and in 
subsequent investments to get those innovations understood and 
used by physicians and their patients. The difficulties of creating 
even a single successful medicine is the stuff of legend. 
There are no high-risk, low-reward businesses that can sustain 
themselves over the long term. Investors in pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies are not an exception. Where bio-
pharmaceutical companies have failed to sustain an acceptable 
return114 consistent with the risk the investment in creating new 
medicines entails, they have disappeared.115 Investors in research-
based biopharmaceutical companies expect financial returns on 
 
$4 generic drug prescription cost. See $4 Prescriptions, supra note 17. 
 114.  The difficulties of sustaining a successful return on investment have been 
well documented. 
   Over the course of the four years of this analysis, the [study’s] 
cohort of 12 companies has launched 105 products and transferred 
$770 billion of projected value into their commercial portfolios to the 
benefit of patients. Over the same period, the research and 
development (R&D) engines of these companies have pulled 167 assets 
into late stage development, with a total risk adjusted value of $819 
billion. 
   Despite these positive indicators, the projected return on 
investment in innovation that the cohort’s late stage pipeline is 
expected to deliver has continued to decline across the four years, 
from 10.5 percent in 2010 to 4.8 per cent in 2013. The cohort result 
hides wide variations in company performance. Some companies are 
achieving higher rates of return and others are struggling to safeguard 
growth. 
DELOITTE UK CENTRE FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, MEASURING THE RETURN FROM 




 115.  A large collection of research-based pharmaceutical companies have 
disappeared since 1989. The list includes companies that had been in business for 
over 100 years before being eliminated through a merger. The Upjohn Company, 
Wyeth, Schering-Plough, Squibb, Syntex, Warner-Lambert, A.H. Robbins, 
SmithKline, Wellcome, Beecham, American Cyanamid, Sterling Winthrop, 
Zeneca, Beecham, Hoechst, Marion, Mallinkrodt, Knoll, Schering AG, Alza, 
McNeil Laboratories, Fisons, Ciba-Geigy, Rhône Poulenc, Synthélabo, DuPont 
Pharmaceuticals, Roussel, Rorer, Farmitalia Carlo Erba, and Pharmacia are all 
companies that ceased independent existence during the past twenty-five years. 
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investments in developing new medicines that are, prospectively at 
least, commensurate with the development risk as well as the 
marketing risk. New medicines have, out of necessity, become 
relatively more costly. They must be priced to pay back the 
investments needed to create them and to create markets for them. 
Most new medicines cannot be priced high enough to make the 
investment in creating them a profitable one.116 
Medicines, once approved for marketing, do not make markets 
for themselves. A new medicine, once available in the marketplace, 
cannot succeed commercially without changing the practice of 
medicine. For a new medicine to be used, physicians need to 
understand the patients who can benefit from a new therapy, 
understand the limitations on the use of the medicine, learn what 
side effects to expect, and prescribe the medicine to patients who 
similarly require information on what to expect (and not to 
expect) from the new medicine. 
The education and marketing investment needed to get a new 
medicine prescribed by physicians and successfully used by patients 
is enormous. The ongoing efforts to educate and promote 
marketed medicines are of the same order of magnitude as the 
ongoing R&D expenses to create them.117 
As noted earlier, the creation risks and marketing risks are 
compounded by the need for a new medicine just coming into the 
market to compete against any established medicines in the same 
therapeutic class, an increasing number of which over time are 
available in the form of low-cost copies. For a new medicine to 
break into a market where multiple generic drugs are already 
available in the marketplace—or would be available by the time the 
new entrant could gain regulatory approval—requires much more 
than assuring the new medicine is a safe and effective product. 
It requires some basis for projecting that the clinical results 
from the testing of the medicine, once completed, will produce 
sufficient advantages over generic copies of all existing medicines 
 
 116.  See JIM GILBERT ET AL, supra note 16. 
 117.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that in 2008 the cost 
of developing the market from new medicines among major pharmaceutical 
companies was $20.5 billion. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND ISSUE BRIEF: 
PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 2 (2009), available at http://www 
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10522/12-02-drugpromo 
_brief.pdf. This compares, according to CBO numbers, with an ongoing annual 
R&D cost of $38 billion for the industry. Id.  
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such that patients and their insurers will be willing to pay a 50-fold 
or 100-fold premium in the pricing for the new medicine. Without 
the ability to make that projection, the investment to create the 
new medicine—however promising otherwise—becomes irrational. 
Although the generic and the innovative industries both 
manufacture medicines, the generic drug industry otherwise is 
everything that the innovative industry is not—and vice versa. The 
generic industry was designed to exist without the need either to 
discover new medicines or the need to undertake the massive 
clinical effort thereafter required to get them approved for 
marketing. In sum, the “product acquisition” cost for a generic 
drug manufacturer is negligible. 
By way of comparison, the figures set out above indicate the 
relative difference in product acquisition costs as between the two 
industries are three or four orders of magnitude different. The 
development costs to bring a copy of a new drug to market under 
the generic drug approval pathway under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
are probably less than a tenth of a penny on the dollar of the 
comparable cost for a biopharmaceutical company to bring the 
new medicine to market. On the marketing side, the same ratio 
applies. For each dollar the originator of a new drug spends to 
create a market for a new medicine, the copiers can seize the 
market for the medicine for less than a tenth of a penny on the 
dollar of marketing spend. 
The Hatch-Waxman copied products are marketed as generic 
drugs. They are literally generic products. Most are unbranded. As 
such they are not promoted in the marketplace—and cannot be 
promoted in the marketplace. Unlike a typical manufacturer/ 
marketer, a generic drug manufacturer can at most assert in the 
marketplace that the generic medicine is undifferentiated from the 
original version of the product being copied. However, the FDA 
moots even the need for a generic drug manufacturer to note that 
its products are nondifferentiated. The FDA’s rating system dictates 
that generic drugs meeting a bioequivalence standard are fully 
interchangeable with the original version of the new medicine.118 
 
 118.  See OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at viii (34th ed. 2014), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess 
/UCM071436.pdf (commonly referred to as the “Orange Book”). 
   Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, manufacturers seeking approval to market a generic drug 
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In sum, generic drug manufacturers not only do not need to 
brand their products, they do not need to educate physicians on 
their use, or otherwise promote them. The FDA regulatory regime 
provides that generic drugs are approved solely by demonstrating 
bioequivalence to the new medicine that they have copied. Copied 
versions of new drugs are government certified as substitutes for 
the original version of the new medicine. 
In the business of prescribing and dispensing medicines to 
patients, generic drugs are freely substitutable and today are 
typically freely substituted for the original version of the medicine. 
Throughout the United States, state law requirements either 
encourage or mandate that a prescription for a medicine be filled 
with a generic copy, if available.119 The net effect of these 
requirements is to transfer to generic drug manufacturers, upon 
generic drug entry, the bulk of the value created by the originator 
of the medicine in the medicine’s trademarks and associated 
goodwill. 
As a result of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory regime, virtually 
the only business risk faced by a generic drug manufacturer is the 
risk of failing to be among the lowest-cost manufacturers of the 
 
product must submit data demonstrating that the drug product is 
bioequivalent to the pioneer (innovator) drug product. A major 
premise underlying the 1984 law is that bioequivalent drug products 
are therapeutically equivalent and, therefore, interchangeable.  
Id.  
 119.  Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded Drugs, in 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 155–56 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey 
Hsieh eds., 2007). 
   States generally have one of two types of substitution laws: 
permissive substitution laws and mandatory substitution laws. 
Mandatory substitution states require that pharmacists substitute 
generic drugs for branded drugs where a generic is available and other 
requirements are fulfilled. Permissive substitution states allow 
pharmacists to substitute generic drugs for branded drugs. According 
to the 2003-2004 National Association of Boards of Pharmacy’s Survey of 
Pharmacy Law (2004), 11 states and Puerto Rico had mandatory generic 
substitution laws. In 38 other states plus the District of Columbia and 
Guam, pharmacists were permitted, but not mandated, to substitute 
generic drugs for brand name drug products. In either case, payers, 
physicians, and pharmacists had a strong economic incentive to 
substitute generic drugs for branded drugs. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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copied versions of a new medicine. In effect, the business model of 
a generic drug manufacturer today means that generic drugs can 
be profitably sold—and provide a profit for the generic drug 
manufacturer proportionate to the relatively minimal risks of being 
in the generic drug business—at little more than the cost to 
manufacture those copies.120 
In most industry sectors, it would be difficult to explain how 
the medicine-creating business could have survived the competitive 
onslaught of the medicines-copying business that can both free-ride 
off the R&D of the innovator and then free-ride off the marketing 
investments. If there is an explanation, that explanation begins—
and perhaps ends—with IP protection. The reason that a minority 
of the research-based, innovative pharmaceutical companies that 
were in business at the start of the Hatch-Waxman era have 
survived through today, is that their new medicines were accorded 
sufficient IP protection to produce a return on the investments 
needed to create them. 
The importance of a secure and predictable IP regime cannot 
be underestimated when the competition in the marketplace can 
operate generically with a government certification of equivalence 
of the products it places into the marketplace. No one can dispute 
that, in IP-intensive industry sectors with significant R&D costs to 
create a new product, the emergence of a government-certified 
“generic copy” industry would have been the death knell for the 
innovation-based industry absent sufficient IP protection from 
copying. 
 
 120.  A possible flaw in the generic drug business model is the loss from the 
market of generic manufacturers that are not among the lowest-cost producers or, 
were such manufacturers to make needed investments to remain in the 
manufacturing business for a generic drug, could not retain the status as a lowest-
cost producer. Shortages of generic drugs have become increasingly common in 
recent years, which may be attributable in part to the type of price competition has 
served to limit the number of manufacturers that are in, can remain in, or can 
enter the market for a particular generic medicine. As counterintuitive as it might 
seem, it might be in the best interests of consumers for the FDA to be given 
authority to set minimum prices at which shortage-prone generic copies of new 
medicines might be sold in the marketplace. While the drug shortage topic has 
been extensively studied by the FDA, their efforts may have missed the IP-related 
root cause of such shortages and the facile economic solution to address that root 
cause that a pricing floor might represent. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN 
FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES (2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM372566 
.pdf (last visited on Mar. 27, 2014). 
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Imagine Microsoft staying in business selling Windows 8.1 and 
its MS Office 2013 if government-certified copied versions of 
Windows 7 and Office 2010 could be developed today for the 
market and then sold as government-certified equivalents for 
quality and functionality for little more than the cost of copying. If, 
of course, Office 2013 provided revolutionary advantages for users 
compared to Office 2010, it is possible that users might be willing 
to pay a ten-fold higher price for the improvements in Office 2013. 
However, it would take an almost unimaginably improved product 
for a customer to pay a 100-fold higher price for an innovative, 
branded product. If Windows 8.1 had been such a revolutionary 
advance over Windows 7, then this would provide only a small bit of 
breathing space for the innovator. It would then need a 
comparably improved product in Windows 9 to gain market share 
over a generic copy of Windows 8.1. It becomes relatively easy to 
understand that protection from copying—and protection for a 
significant time period—lies at the heart of an effective IP regime 
that is essential for an innovation business to survive the onslaught 
of competition from government-certified copies. 
The risks to the survival of the remainder of the research-based 
biopharmaceutical industry from the generic drug industry grow 
more acute over time. Today, as noted earlier, almost every new 
drug that came to market during the twentieth century now has 
generic copies in the marketplace. For some important therapeutic 
categories, multiple new drugs have generic copies competing in 
the marketplace. With the 2014 commercial reality in mind, what 
does this suggest about the MODDERN Cures Act paradigm for IP 
protection vis-à-vis the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act? 
First, with all the risk factors faced by originators in sustaining 
an innovation model, the risk of insufficient or insecure IP 
protection can readily be the last straw of risk that breaks the back 
of the business model. The MODDERN Cures Act was conceived as 
a means of taking IP risk off the table as a reason why the 
originator might not proceed to develop a promising experimental 
medicine. 
Second, the MODDERN Cures Act puts a stake in the ground 
on what the period of IP protection should be to provide the 
optimal balance between incentives for innovation and the 
economic value that can arise from access to regulatory pathways 
for bringing low-cost copies to market. What is the justification for 
a fifteen-year IP protection period, after which copied versions of 
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new medicines can be freely approved under abbreviated 
regulatory approval pathways? As will be discussed below, there are 
compelling reasons for the fifteen-year IP protection period 
contained in the Act. 
V. THE CASE FOR THE MODDERN CURES ACT: A FIFTEEN-YEAR 
PATENT PROTECTION AND DATA PACKAGE PROTECTION PERIOD WITH 
COPIED VERSIONS BEING FREELY MARKETED THEREAFTER 
A. The MODDERN Cures Model Eliminates Any Possible Need for Patent 
Litigation-Related Provisions in the Regulatory/IP Interface 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent linkage plays an 
essential role in the overall IP protection regime. “Patent linkage” 
means, as noted above, that the data package protection period is 
ultimately the patent protection period. The only way to determine 
the applicable patent protection period is to know which of the 
originator’s relevant patents were valid and infringed. Once patent 
linkage is elected as the governing principle for determining how 
long the data package protection period will last, a cascade of 
related provisions must follow to establish the subsidiary issues of 
patent validity and patent infringement. This includes setting out 
provisions that take account of who might sue whom, when, and 
over what patents. 
The MODDERN Cures Act, which uses the patent protection 
period as the data package protection period, gets to exactly the 
same end, but arrives from the opposite starting point. Instead of 
using the vagaries of the patent protection period to define an 
equally less certain and less predictable data package protection 
period, the MODDERN Cures Act uses a fixed and certain data 
package protection period to define an equally fixed and certain 
patent protection period.121 While the Hatch-Waxman Act was 
crafted on the assumption that, given patent term restoration, 
there would be a floor of fourteen years of patent protection, the 
MODDERN Cures Act sets out a unified IP protection of fifteen 
years—the floor and the ceiling are at the same elevation.122 The 
MODDERN Cures framework inherently removes the relevancy for 
the Hatch-Waxman patent linkage to data protection—if anything, 
 
 121.  See H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 201(e)(2)(C) (2013). 
 122.  Id. § 201(i)(4)(B). 
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it substitutes linking patents to data package protection, rather 
than vice versa. 
The required patent disclaimer provisions under MODDERN 
Cures assure that there will be no outstanding patent rights of 
necessary relevance once the fifteen-year protection period ends.123 
In the absence of patents that can be infringed after the end of the 
common IP protection period, there is no reason for a generic 
drug monopoly period of the type found in the Hatch-Waxman 
Act. There simply will be no patent litigation related to the 
approval of copied versions of new medicines—either before the 
approval or after the approval. As for the patent-related provisions 
of the Biosimilars Act, there is no basis for a patent dialogue 
between originator and copier because there will be no relevant 
patents that can be enforced by the originator against the copier 
once the data package protection period ends and the copier can 
secure regulatory approval to market. 
The MODDERN Cures Act approach represents the superior 
public policy. The patent risks and uncertainties in a patent-linked, 
patent-centric system can equally bedevil both originators and 
copiers. It follows that both originators and copiers benefit if those 
risks can be mitigated or, as with the MODDERN Cures Act, even 
eliminated. Importantly, as outlined earlier, patent perversity 
disappears. The most challenging and difficult new medicines to 
develop are no longer punished with disproportionately shorter IP 
protection periods. The MODDERN Cures Act has provisions that 
assure that, what otherwise would be pathologically short-lived 
patents, will be fully restored to the end of the fifteen-year IP 
protection period. The prospect of inadequate IP protection will 
no longer be a factor to be weighed against bringing a promising 
experimental medicine into the clinic. 
An interface based entirely upon a common, fixed IP 
protection period, devoid of patent linkage, can be as simple in 
actual operation as the Hatch-Waxman patent-centric system is 
complex. The only significant challenge in creating the new 
architecture lies in optimizing the length for the protection period 
itself. It must be a sufficient period for the originator of the new 
medicine to have the reasonable prospect of earning back the 
investment required to discover and develop the medicine through 
FDA approval in the first place, but it must also assure that patients 
 
 123.  See id. § 201(c). 
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will get the benefits of low-cost, copied versions of those new 
medicines in as reasonably prompt a timeframe as possible. 
B. Setting the Unified IP Protection Period at Fifteen Years is the Optimal 
Policy Choice 
1. Hatch-Waxman’s Fourteen-Year Patent Term Restoration Period 
Translates into a Fifteen-Year IP Protection Period Taking 
Account of Pediatric Exclusivity and the Generic Drug Monopoly, 
Making It a Benchmark for Testing the Adequacy for the IP 
Protection Period for New Medicines Directed to Unmet Medical 
Needs 
In economic terms, the right data package protection period 
should be relatively straightforward to determine, if the objective is to 
assure that the protection period is adequate, on average, for the originator 
of the new medicine to be able to earn back in profits from sales revenues the 
investment needed to create the new medicine in the first place. The Hatch-
Waxman Act contained a benchmark for such a period when it 
authorized patent term restoration for a fourteen-year period from 
the date the original version of a new medicine was originally 
approved, whether a new drug subject to the new abbreviated 
approval pathways in the Act or a biologic medicine for which no 
like pathway would exist until 2009. The fourteen-year period was 
adopted in 1984 when—as described earlier—inventors in other 
technologies might expect a seventeen-year patent life for 
nonpharmaceutical patented products in any circumstance, where 
the issuance of the relevant patents coincided with the time at 
which the patented product entered the marketplace.124 
Under the post-1994 patent law, Congress concluded that up 
to a twenty-year patent protection period could be regarded as an 
appropriate IP protection period for products needing little in the 
way of engineering or other development work before entering the 
market. The twenty-year patent life could be achieved given the 
statutory twenty-year patent term allows for an additional one-year 
period during which provisional patent filings can be made before 
the twenty years of patent life commences.125 If the provisional 
patent year was used for the engineering and other development 
 
 124.  See supra Part III.E. 
 125.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(3) (2006) (providing that a provisional patent 
filing under 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) “shall not be taken into account in determining 
the term of a patent”). 
53
Armitage: The Hatch-Watchman Act: A Path Forward for Making It More Modern
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
2014] HATCH-WAXMAN: MAKING IT MORE MODERN 1253 
work needed to prepare that nonpharmaceutical patented product 
for the marketplace, the patents on the product would expire 
twenty years after marketing of the product commenced. 
An IP protection period of fourteen, seventeen, or even twenty 
years would each be consistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
original intent—and the intent of Congress in setting terms of 
protection under patents. As noted above, when enacted in 1984, 
the Hatch-Waxman law effectively created a fourteen-year floor on 
patent life for many new medicines.126 Recent statistics indicate that 
nearly one in three patents extended since 1984 under the Hatch-
Waxman Act were reset to expire at the end of the fourteen-year 
period from regulatory approval.127 Thus, except where patent 
protection works perversely, the fourteen-year protection period 
remains the historic benchmark for testing the adequacy of an IP 
protection period for a new medicine—drug or biologic—coming 
to market.128 In terms of a floor on protection, there would be no 
reason to reject a fourteen-year protection period. 
Also, as intentionally constructed, the MODDERN Cures Act 
does not permit adding an additional six months of further 
protection at the end of the fourteen-year patent term restoration 
 
 126.  See supra note 101 (noting the 24-year effective patent life for EPOGEN). 
 127.  See Patent Term Extensions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www 
.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/156.jsp (last visited Mar. 2, 2014), for a 
listing of restored patent terms under 35 U.S.C. § 156, pursuant to the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Since 1984, over 600 patents have been extended, the large majority 
of which are patents claiming new medicines. The five-year or two-year limitation 
on the length of the permitted period of extension limited approximately 30% of 
the patents extended. Another approximately 40% of patent extension were 
ultimately limited by the required deduction from the “regulatory review period” 
of the testing phase of the product on which the extension was based. The final 
(approximately) 30% of reported extensions were limited by the fourteen-year cap 
on the patent expiration from the date of product approval. 
 128.  Moreover, at least in some situations, the patent protection period under 
the pre-1995 patent law afforded patent protection periods for new medicines of 
longer than fourteen years based on patents other than the patent selected by the 
originator for patent term restoration. Finally, in yet other situations no patent 
term extension was ever sought under the Hatch-Waxman Act because all the 
relevant patents on the new medicine had longer than fourteen years of 
remaining patent life at the time the new medicine was approved. As one example, 
the relevant patents for the medicine Epogen, approved in 1989, all had patent 
terms extending beyond the fourteen-year Hatch-Waxman limit on patent term 
restoration. The relevant Epogen patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (filed Nov. 30, 
1984), entitled “DNA Sequences Encoding Erythropoietin,” issued on October 27, 
1987, less than three years from the regulatory approval for Epogen in June 1989. 
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period based upon “pediatric investigations.”129 Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, tacking on an additional six-month pediatric 
exclusivity period to the end of the fourteen-year protection period 
suggests an effective floor of fourteen-and-a-half years of IP 
protection would be appropriate. Additionally, Congress conceived 
that an additional 180-day generic drug monopoly period might 
apply in certain situations.130 When the additional period applies, 
the fourteen-and-a-half-year floor on the protection period 
becomes a fifteen-year period before all generic competitors are 
permitted to freely enter the market. 
While the framework that offered the ability to secure such a 
fifteen-year protection period under the Hatch-Waxman Act is not 
dispositive of its appropriateness for the MODDERN Cures Act 
framework, it is relevant in one important respect. It would clearly 
be perverse if medicines that were relatively simple and more 
straightforward to develop could readily secure this type of fifteen-
year IP protection period under the current Hatch-Waxman Act,131 
but medicines addressing unmet medical needs—with much longer 
routes to FDA approval—were confined to a shorter IP protection 
period. 
2. A Fifteen-Year IP Protection Period Is Supported by Economic 
Analysis Indicating a Fifteen-Year Period Is Typically Essential 
for a New Medicine to Pay Back the Investment Made to Develop 
It 
The most significant work analyzing the necessary IP 
protection period that would allow a new medicine to earn back for 
the originator the investment needed to create the new medicine 
was undertaken by Henry Grabowski.132 The Grabowski work uses a 
 
 129.  See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), 
Pub. L. No. 112-114, tit. V, 126 Stat. 993, 1039 (2012) (making permanent the 
provisions of the Best Pharmaceutical for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 
115 Stat. 1408 (2002)). Under 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)(1) (2012), an additional six 
months of data package protection and effective patent protection is available for 
submitting information to the FDA. 
 130.  See supra Part III.G. 
 131.  For example, because they could be developed so facilely that their 
patent terms could be restored to the full fourteen-year period, not taking account 
of the six-month pediatric extension and the 180-day generic drug monopoly 
period. 
 132.  Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance 
Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 479 (2008).  
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pair of discount rates to calculate possible “breakeven” scenarios 
for investments made to create new medicines.133 The conclusion 
from his work is straightforward. An IP protection period that is 
less than a term of thirteen to sixteen years would not be sufficient. 
When the net present values (NPV) of inflow just equals 
outflows, this is the break-even point at which a firm 
recovers its R&D investment and earns a risk-adjusted rate 
of return. The breakeven time is 12.9 years for a discount 
rate of 11.5%, and 16.2 years for a 12.5% discount rate.134 
While this work was done on new biologic medicines, its 
fundamental methodology applies to new medicines of all types—
and increasingly so, as the costs and risks of bringing new 
medicines successfully to market have steadily accelerated. Under 
the Grabowski analysis, it is clear that the twelve-year data package 
protection period from the Biologics Act is too short by itself to 
provide the necessary payback period. Moreover, as suggested by 
the “patent dialogue” provisions in the Biosimilars Act, Congress 
anticipated that the effective IP protection period could be 
significantly longer—the longer period arising from enforcement 
of patents to yield the appropriate aggregate protection period. 
The MODDERN Cures Act, in the course of eliminating any 
patent-based IP protection period after the end of the data package 
protection period ends, employs a Grabowski-consistent period of 
fifteen years. This fifteen-year protection period thus can be viewed 
as neither unwarranted nor excessive given that access to this 
protection period is limited to experimental medicines being 
investigated to address unmet medical needs. 
3. The Fifteen-Year IP Protection Period Assures the Fullest and Best 
Uses of a New Medicine Can Be Investigated and Approved for 
Use in Patients 
Much of the most important research on every new medicine 
takes place not before, but after the FDA has approved the 
medicine for use. This is the research into new indications for use, 
uses to prevent and not just treat a disease, patient populations 
where the medicine may be especially effective and useful (or carry 
 
 133.  “The break-even lifetimes for the mean [biologic] product were found to 
be between 12.9 and 16.2 years at alternative discount rates of 11.5% and 12.5%, 
respectively.” Id. at 487. 
 134.  Id. at 486 (text accompanying Figure 6). 
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particular risks and liabilities), and safety issues that arise and need 
to be fully understood. For this research to be sustained, and for 
the fullest and best uses of the medicine to be understood and for 
physicians to be fully educated on the use of the medicine by the 
time generic copies arrive on the market, it is critical that 
incentives exist to continue this type of post-approval research 
during the decade after the medicine reaches the market. 
With a fifteen-year IP protection period, the originator is 
positioned to continue investments in research during the decade 
after the medicine first reaches the market. If inexpensive generic 
copies come to market too soon, the investment needed to create 
and disseminate the information needed to put the medicine to its 
fullest uses will never be made. 
4. The National Academies Recommended a Data-Package 
Protection Period for Protecting All New Medicines That Is 
Consistent with a Fifteen-Year Protection Period for Medicines to 
Address Unmet Medical Needs 
In 2007, the National Academy of Sciences, the National 
Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine jointly 
published a report135 in which the deficiencies of the existing data 
package protection regimes for new medicines were laid out in 
case-study form. The National Academies concluded that a serious 
effort was needed to determine how best to balance available 
patent protection for new medicines with data package 
protection.136 It laid out the case for a more data-focused regime. 
Pending completion of a study to determine a fully adequate 
protection period, the National Academies recommended that 
Congress should move ahead immediately with at least a ten- to 
eleven-year period of data package protection to provide some 
parity with the European data package protection regime that 
currently affords up to an eleven-year protection from the approval 
of generic copies of all new medicines.137 
 
 135.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM: 
ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE (2007). 
 136.  Id. at 190–92. 
 137.  Id. 
The demands for data on a molecule’s safety and efficacy are 
increasing. The generation of the necessary data requires time and 
money. It is to patients’ benefit for as much time as appropriate to be 
devoted to the development of the data, but spending the time lessens 
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The MODDERN Cures Act provision for a fifteen-year fixed 
and common data package and patent protection period for 
medicines directed to unmet medical needs is fully consistent with 
the National Academies’ study.138 
 
the return on the developer’s investment because it encroaches on the 
patent term. Bringing a new medicine to patients requires a sequence 
of major breakthroughs, which in the current system must be 
accomplished well before the life of a patent runs out. Often, the clock 
does run out, and the innovator must start over with a new molecule 
simply to get time ‘back on the clock.’ As a result, there is an ever 
growing ‘graveyard’ currently comprising more than 10 million 
compounds. There is no incentive to exhume these compounds in the 
absence of substantial data-package exclusivity, because patents will be 
either unavailable or of such narrow coverage that they would be easy 
to avoid in developing a related drug.  
Id. at 191. 
 138.  One subject not addressed in this article is the issue of additional reforms 
that might be appropriate once the MODDERN Cures Act is enacted into law. 
One possible modification to both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act, 
fully consistent with the MODDERN Cure Act principles, would be to provide an 
alternative to the existing patent term restoration and data package protection 
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act with respect to any medicine for which 
patent term restoration under the existing law had not been secured. Congress 
could provide an originator with the option to elect a fixed IP protection period, 
irrespective of whether the medicine addressed an unmet medical need. Like the 
MODDERN Cures model, new patent term provisions could extend all relevant 
patents of the originator of the new medicine so that they would expire at the end 
of a new fourteen-year IP protection period, thereby superseding the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s provision that only a single patent would be eligible for such a 
fourteen-year post-approval patent life. This new IP protection period would 
include a concurrent fourteen-year data package protection period to accompany 
the patent term restoration provisions. In addition, as a prerequisite for electing 
the new IP protection provisions, the originator would be required to proffer a 
disclaimer of the type set out in the MODDERN Cures Act with respect to any of 
the relevant patents of the originator that would expire beyond the end of the 
fourteen-year IP protection period. The current provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and the Biosimilars Act would then continue to apply to all new medicines for 
which no election to operate under the new law was sought. This elective 
framework, self-evidently, would provide benefits to both the originators of new 
medicines and the copiers of those medicines and admirably serve the same policy 
objectives as the MODDERN Cures Act. As such, it might be worth considering on 
its merits independently of whether the MODDERN Cures Act were to become 
law. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was a bold initiative by its 
congressional sponsors that today has met or exceeded all of its 
expectations, at least as they related to the creation of a new 
generic drug industry able to reliably supply low-cost, high-quality 
copied versions of new medicines to the marketplace. The generic 
manufacturers’ growing market share of the U.S. prescription drug 
market suggests that nothing more is needed to further secure the 
generic industry’s role as a major contributor to the health of the 
American public. 
The story for the research-based industry is, however, more 
mixed. Over the Hatch-Waxman era, its new medicines have 
revolutionized the treatment of many diseases. It has been able to 
increase its R&D investments. At the same time, consolidation has 
reduced the ranks of the innovators dramatically. Its declining 
share of the prescription medicines business, coupled with the 
relentlessness of low-cost generic competition from earlier-
generation innovations of the research-based industry, makes its 
future less assured. 
For the research-based industry to have a reasonable 
opportunity to innovate its way to a successful future, it is critical 
that it be able to focus the talents of its researchers on the best 
ideas for new medicines. This requires some assurance that, if those 
ideas are successfully brought through the research process to the 
market, fair and predictable protection from low-cost generic and 
other low-cost, follow-on competition will exist—and will continue 
for a period sufficient to create a reasonable prospect of paying 
back the investment in the research needed to get those medicines 
to market. 
It should be unacceptable to all the relevant constituencies—
patients, providers of healthcare, third-party payors, and public 
health policymakers—that a highly promising experimental 
medicine cannot proceed into development because its projected 
patent life is too short, the patent protection seems too tenuous, or 
patent protection was simply unavailable. By adopting the 
MODDERN Cures Act’s fixed and certain fifteen-year IP protection 
period for medicines directed to unmet medical needs, patients 
and their physicians could gain access to the best new choices in 
therapy—with the best and most complete uses of those medicines 
fully elaborated through continuing, post-approval research. When 
low-cost copied versions of those new medicines take over the 
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market from the original version of the medicine, the market will 
be a fully developed one in which the best and most complete uses 
of those medicines will be well understood by physicians. 
In the foreword to this issue, Senator Hatch suggests that the 
success of the Hatch Waxman Act might “inspire[] ideas on how to 
improve the effects of the Act through additional legislation.”139 
That, in a nutshell, was the intent of this article, namely that the 
MODDERN Cures Act holds the promise of being a more modern 
incarnation of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Congress can achieve a 
“win-win-win” outcome through the MODDERN Cures Act. 
Innovators of new medicines would be freed to do what they do 
best—create the best in new medicines for patients, irrespective of 
whether those new medicines have the best patents. Copiers would 
gain easy and predictable access to the new medicine’s market once 
a fixed IP protection period ends. Above all, patients would secure 
the benefits from the best of both worlds—new medicines that 
come from a focus on addressing today’s unmet medical needs and 
high-quality copies of these new medicines that then become 
reliably available at the lowest possible cost. 
 
 139  Orrin. G. Hatch, Foreword, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1194, 1199 (2014). 
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